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Abstract 
Information theory (Shannon, 1948) and relative similarity (Rosch and Mervis, 1975) are 
used to investigate the problem of how people communicate about ambiguous, unstructured 
stimuli. Specifically, the following one-way communication setting is considered: given a set 
of ambiguous items available to both a sender and a receiver, the sender uses messages to 
describe one of the items from the set, such that the receiver is able to identify this target 
item correctly. It is argued that information reduces uncertainty in ambiguous communication 
settings through the development of structure, which is conceptualized in terms of a system 
of categories. During the communication process, distinguishing an item from a set of other 
items involves clustering items into subsets; that is, grouping items together that are similar 
to one another and leaving out items that are dissimilar. It is proposed that relative similarity 
is the cognitive mechanism involved in the development of those categories. It is further 
proposed that perceptions of relative similarity are made with respect to one attribute. People 
take advantage of the perceived structure of the ambiguous stimulus and form categories in a 
goal-directed manner, focusing on whatever attribute best enables them to distinguish the 
target item from the others (Barsalou, 1983). Each time one attribute is used in 
communication to refer to a cluster or subset of items, uncertainty is reduced. Furthermore, it 
is postulated that when people have the choice of one attribute from multiple possible 
attributes to communicate about unstructured stimuli, two categorization logics operate to 
reduce uncertainty. Hypothesis 1 predicts that people maximize distinctiveness by choosing 
the attribute that allows for a larger gap (i.e., greater dissimilarity) between the subset 
containing the target item and the subset of remaining items. Hypothesis 2 predicts that 
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people maximize information gain by choosing the attribute that allows for the smaller subset 
containing the target item. The theoretical framework is built upon illustrative examples. 
Three experiments were conducted to investigate the cognitive mechanisms that 
people use to identify and describe a specific ambiguous item from among a set of 
ambiguous items during communication. Participants took the role of either sender or 
receiver in a one-way communication situation. In the role of sender they ranked a set of 
descriptions/attributes based on the degree to which they thought the descriptions would 
enable an imagined receiver to identify a specific target item from a set of ambiguous items. 
As receiver, they were given specific descriptions/attributes from an imagined sender, and 
ranked a set of ambiguous items based on which of the items they thought the sender was 
referring to. Experiments 1 and 2 used two different kinds of unstructured stimuli; 
experiment 3 utilized a structured way of manipulating unstructured/ambiguous stimulus. 
The results of experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. There were 
strong consistency between the two different stimuli and, therefore, strong evidence for 
generalizability of the observed effects. The results of experiment 3 gave inconsistent support 
for the hypotheses. The theoretical framework, the design of the experiments, and the results 
are discussed.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Suppose an experimenter has hidden money in one of 8 boxes1. The experimenter wants 
to know the minimum number of guesses needed to find that money. The event – lifting 
one of the boxes – has 8 possible outcomes. In order to choose the right box, participants 
of the experiment need information, something that can reduce uncertainty in the 
outcome, i.e., anything that reduces the number of boxes from 8 to 1. A participant is told 
that s/he can ask any questions to which the experimenter can answer yes or no. The 
participant then lines up the boxes in a row, divides the 8 boxes into two sets of 4, and 
asks the experimenter whether the money is in the set on the left side. The experimenter 
confirms. By answering “Yes” or “No” to the question, the experimenter is giving 
information to the participant. The information given reduces the number of possible 
outcomes from the initial 8 to only 4. No money was found yet. The participant repeats 
exactly what was done before. S/he lines up the 4 boxes and divides them in two new 
subsets of 2 boxes each. Next, s/he inquires whether the money is hidden in the set on the 
left side or not, and the experimenter says “No”. Two guesses were made up to this point, 
reducing the number of possible choices to two. The participant knows that with one 
more question s/he can get the money. With only 2 boxes remaining, if there is no money 
in the box on the left side, the money has to be in the box on the right side. As we can 
                                                      
1	This example has been used by Professor Frank Safayeni to teach Organizational Theory and Behaviour, 
MSCI 605, at the University of Waterloo, during the Fall 2008. It was also used as introduction of my own 
Masters’ thesis (Pimenta, 2011).	
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see, 3 guesses are necessary to find the money. By using this determined way of 
organizing things, 3 guesses are needed to get from 8 possible boxes to one. Holding 
constant all conditions of task performance, the number of guesses will not change 
regardless of which box the money is hidden in. 
The money in the box example can be used to illustrate Shannon’s classic 
communication theory (Shannon, 1948). First, from the example, it is possible to learn 
Shannon’s concept of entropy. There is initially a set of 8 boxes and money is hidden in 
one of them. With no information, there are 8 possible outcomes to the task. After 
dividing the set into two subsets of 4 boxes each, when the participant eliminates one of 
the subsets, according to Shannon, entropy (or uncertainty) is being reduced to half (from 
8 outcomes to 4), corresponding to a gain of 1 bit of information for the experimental 
participant.  
Second, in Information Theory messages are communicated as 1s and 0s. The 
money in the box example is based on the assumption that items can be lined up into one 
dimension or on a continuum and that the arrangement makes possible the use of codes to 
identify each item. The fact that the boxes were all lined up in a row, on a one 
dimensional axis, made it easy for the participant to consecutively divide them into two 
subsets and to code the subsets as left/right. In other words, dividing the set of 8 boxes 
into two sub-categories or sub-clusters, is the same as coding with 1s and 0s in 
Information Theory. In this case, 1 would be left and 0, right. The participant is allowed 
to ask whether the money is in the clustered boxes on the left side. By answering Yes/No 
to the question, the experimenter is reducing uncertainty because the participant can now 
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discount one of the sub-clusters and focus on the other one. Since both of them can easily 
recognize the subcategories created, they can make clear reference to the two clusters of 
boxes. 
Finally, it is the structure of the boxes (how they were organized) that allowed 
their division into two subsets which, in turn, permitted the experimenter to indicate in 
which subset the money was located. That information helped the participant to reduce 
the number of boxes by half each time s/he asked a question. Without the predefined 
subcategories no information could be conveyed and no uncertainty would be reduced. 
Therefore, structure refers to the internal system of categories of a set that allow for 
uncertainty to be reduced. 
Sets such as the above example, where categories are known and well defined, do 
not always exist. Boundaries between categories are not always clear-cut; most are fuzzy 
and overlapping. Unlike the money in the box example, it is not always possible to line 
up items or to give binary answers to identify an item. When category boundaries are not 
clearly defined, the set of items has less structure or is unstructured. For instance, what if 
the money was hidden inside some undefined shape somewhere in the room. Some 
shapes could be said to be more like a circle because their sides are not very straight. 
Some have quasi-straight sides. Many of them are very similar to each other. Left/right in 
this case would not help. However, since it is still possible to perceive that some items 
are similar to each other and different from others with respect to some aspect or 
attribute, the initial set can still be divided into smaller subsets. For example, the 
participant could perceive that some shapes were more similar to each other with respect 
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to being circular and try to make the experimenter perceive the same. By doing this, they 
would be dividing the shapes into two smaller subsets – for example, mostly circular 
shapes vs. non-circular shapes. Since the initial number of outcomes has been reduced, 
uncertainty also has decreased. A code has been created to facilitate communication. 
Finally, when smaller subsets or categories are created, the set becomes more structured.  
Few studies examine what structure is and how it is cognitively developed during 
the communication process. In my master’s thesis (Pimenta, 2011), I proposed that 
information and category structure are related and that they influence the communication 
process. As suggested by the money in the box example, the participant’s selection of the 
message to be communicated to the experimenter depends on the category structure in 
which that message is embedded. On the other hand, the experimenter’s interpretation of 
the message received also depends on his/her individual category structure. According to 
Shannon’s Information Theory (Shannon, 1948), information conveyed in 
communication reduces uncertainty relative to a predefined set of possibilities. Thus in an 
unstructured situation, information can only be conveyed (and uncertainty reduced) after 
some structure has been created to define the available set of possibilities. In structured 
stimuli, such as the money in the box example, uncertainty comes from not knowing the 
outcome of an event. When the experimenter says “Yes” or “No” to one of the 
participant’s questions, uncertainty is reduced because the number of boxes (outcomes) 
decreases by half. There is no uncertainty regarding which boxes the 
experimenter/participant are referring to because the boxes were lined up and coded – left 
side and right side – each time a division was made. In the case of unstructured stimuli, 
there are two sources of uncertainty to be dealt with. The sender experiences uncertainty 
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with respect to which codes/categories can be used to best distinguish the target item 
from other items in the set (left/right in the money in the box example) and the receiver 
experiences uncertainty with respect to which item(s) from the set the sender is referring 
to by using a giving code (where the money is).  
The aim of this current research is to investigate the cognitive mechanisms 
involved in developing a suitable structure for communication and human information 
processing. More specifically, I want to investigate how people communicate a target 
from a set of ambiguous items. I propose that when people have to communicate 
categories that are not well defined they use similarity judgments to cluster items into 
smaller subsets. Structure is thereby created by dividing a complex unstructured stimulus 
into a set of categories, as was done in the money in the box example by dividing the 
initial set into smaller subsets of lefts and rights. More specifically, I propose that items 
are categorized based on perceived relative similarity, whereby similarity is maximized 
within categories and minimized between categories with respect to one attribute or 
dimension. Further, I postulate that when multiple attributes are available, the sender 
perceives various ways of clustering the target item based on how similar/dissimilar it is 
to the other items with respect to the various attributes. In addition, I postulate that when 
dealing with multiple perceived attributes, sender and receiver of the message have to 
choose the attribute that best distinguishes the target item from the other items in the set. 
I hypothesize that the chosen attribute is the one that reduces uncertainty by: 1. 
maximizing the dissimilarity between the cluster containing the target and the cluster of 
the other items, and 2. minimizing the size of the subset containing the target item (i.e. by 
eliminating as many of the non-target items as possible).   
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The above hypotheses were tested experimentally. Participants performed three 
experiments in which they communicated about sets of items with different degrees of 
structure. The rest of this work is organized in the following manner. First, the literature 
pertaining to the fields of communication and categorization is reviewed. Second, the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses are developed. Third, the methodology is reported. 
Finally, the general implications of this study including limitations and future research 
are discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Research on communication and categorization  
The main objective of this research is to investigate the cognitive mechanisms involved 
in developing a suitable knowledge structure for communication and human information 
processing. My work will touch upon some of the most basic notions of communication 
theory and categorization. Both phenomena, communication and categorization, have 
received substantial attention in literature. The following sections provide a brief 
summary of the research on communication and categorization followed by the 
description of current approaches.   
2.1 Communication   
Communication is a very broad concept. It has been the object of study in various 
academic fields for professionals including sociologists, linguists, psychologists, 
economists, communication engineers, rhetoricians, and others. Communication research 
can examine a wide variety of groups: organizational, international or intercultural 
groups, small group, interpersonal communication as well as public and mass 
communication. A few handbooks have been published about these subjects such as 
Jablin and Putnam (2004) on organizational communication and Knapp and John (2002) 
on interpersonal communication.  
In general communication can be defined as the exchange of a message from one 
person to another. Most humans are born with the abilities of speaking and listening. By 
making use of those abilities we can communicate to each other. Because communication 
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is so present in our lives, we take it for granted. We do not think about what is needed to 
communicate something, i.e. how we do it. Communication is an extremely complicated 
process in which many different elements are simultaneously involved. This explains 
why miscommunication or lack of understanding is so pervasive in society and academia 
and why there has been so much research on the subject. Recent research shows that 
doctors and patients do not understand one another (Hannawa, 2011; Morgan, 2013), 
team members in organizations miscommunicate (Metiu, 2006; Marceau, 2012; Parsons, 
M. & Urbanski, S., 2012), even legal practitioners, sentence appellants, and journalists 
are all victims of miscommunication (Siôn, 2013).  
Research studying communication models has been plentiful, including Shannon 
and Weaver (1949), Berlo (1960), and Schramm (1954). The first major model of 
communication was conceived, by Shannon and Weaver in 1949, for Bell Laboratories. 
The Shannon and Weaver model of communication had 5 elements: an information 
source (which produces a message); a transmitter (which “encodes” the message into 
signals); a channel (to which signals are adapted for transmission); a receiver (which 
“decodes” the message); and a destination (where the message arrives). The research 
framework section of this paper references Shannon's Information Theory. Therefore the 
Information Theory is discussed in greater detail in a later section. 
In 1960, David Berlo expanded Shannon and Weaver’s model of communication 
and developed the Sender-Message-Channel-Receiver (SMCR) Model of 
Communication. Berlo’s model has four elements to describe the communication 
process: sender, message, channel, and receiver. Each of the four elements is affected by 
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several factors. For instance, sender and receiver are affected by their respective 
communication skills, attitudes, knowledge, social system, and culture.  
Wilbur Schramm (1954) adapted a model from another theorist named Osgood 
and developed the Encode-Decode Model of Communication. Osgood had replaced 
Shannon and Weaver’s linear model of communication with a circular one.  The Osgood-
Schramm model suggested a two-way communication process, and used feedback as an 
important feature.   
As can be observed through this brief introduction, literature on communication is 
classified into different disciplines, theories, and models. Each one of these 
classifications is subject to sub-classifications. A huge amount of literature has been 
published under each of those sub-classifications. Although most of this literature is 
probably important to the respective disciplinary fields, it does not investigate how we 
organize the information processed from the environment and communicate it. The 
relationship between communication and structure has not been well explored. Since 
communication is a social process and effective communication is a function of 
individual category structure, my research focus is on developing a suitable framework to 
investigate this issue.  
2.1.1 Communication Theory 
In general, the term communication theory refers to both the study of the technical 
process of information and the human process of communication. Shannon’s Information 
Theory (Shannon, 1948) is a mathematical model originally developed to describe and 
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solve telecommunication problems such as improving message transfer from source to 
destination with minimal loss, and improving channel capacity. Shannon’s model 
describes communication as a process where information is encoded and transmitted 
from a source A and decoded and received by a receptor B through some channel. It also 
explains important concepts such as uncertainty and information. 
In Shannon’s theory, uncertainty is a set of probable events and information is 
anything that reduces uncertainty. There is a finite set X of mutually exclusive 
alternatives in concern; only one of the alternatives is true; but we are not certain about 
which one it is. Anything helpful to eliminate alternatives is information. The money in 
the box example used in the introduction helps to elucidate these concepts. The initial set 
had 8 boxes. Only one of them had the money hidden inside. Therefore, without any 
information there were 8 possible outcomes. The boxes were divided in two subsets 
(left/right), and the information resulting from the binary answers (yes/no) reduced 
uncertainty because each time a division was made, the number of boxes decreased by 
half. Using Shannon’s theory, one bit of information reduced the number of equally 
probable events by one half, thereby reducing entropy/uncertainty. 
Mathematically, Shannon’s entropy (or uncertainty) is defined by the expression 
					" = − %&& log* %& 
where H is entropy, 	%& is the probability of the ith message occurring and b is the base of  
the logarithm used. Since entropy is usually measured in bits, the value for b is 2.  
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 After Shannon published his mathematical model, psychologists started to apply it 
in the context of psychological problems. Miller (1963) points out the main reason for 
that to happen. He says that Information Theory measures organization. A well-organized 
system is highly predictable – it is possible to know what is going to happen before it 
happens. Thus, there is no information or no learning acquired from this system when it 
does something. However, a disorganized system is unpredictable. When an 
unpredictable system does something, it gives information. If we consider 
communication between two individuals a system, it is a highly disorganized and 
unpredictable system; therefore, highly uncertain. 
The way an individual organizes their knowledge of the world influences how a 
message is selected and communicated to another individual. According to Shannon a 
message is selected from a set of possibilities. In human communication the set of 
possibilities, i.e. the way an individual organizes the world, differs from one person to 
another.  
Human communication is based on the fact that two individuals interacting with 
each other will not have the same structure, i.e., the way a sender and receiver of a 
message categorize that message may differ. The higher the commonalities between two 
people such as same culture, language, background, beliefs, and values, the higher the 
likelihood of overlap between their categories and subcategories. For instance, two civil 
engineers from the same country, educated in the same university have a higher 
probability of understanding each other while talking about a bridge, than does a Spanish 
doctor who speaks English as second language explaining to an English speaking store 
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clerk what kind of screw he needs to finish his home project. 
2.1.2 Studies in Communication Theory 
One of the studies that builds on Shannon’s Information Theory is Uncertainty Reduction 
Theory (URT). Developed by Berger and Calabrese (1975) URT was created to study 
how uncertainty is reduced during the first interactions between strangers. The theory 
contains 7 axioms which describe relationships between uncertainty and communication 
factors. As Berger (2005) points out, URT motivated research concerning the different 
strategies individuals use – active, passive or interactive – to obtain information from 
others (Berger & Bradac, 1982; Berger & Douglas, 1981; Berger & Kellermann, 1983, 
1989, 1994; Kellermann & Berger, 1984). More recently, Kramer et al. used URT to 
investigate the communication experience of pilots involved in an acquisition by another 
airline (Kramer, Dougherty, & Pierce, 2004). Their results indicated that pilots 
experienced high uncertainty with respect to job security over time. In addition, although 
URT proposes that uncertainty causes information seeking, not all pilots responded in 
this way. Some of the pilots preferred to avoid information while others delayed seeking 
for it and interacted with other pilots not to reduce their uncertainties but to seek comfort.   
Recent research dealing with uncertainty and information management is based 
on Uncertainty Management Theory (UMT). Developed originally by Brashers (2001) 
UMT states that uncertainty is not necessarily negative and therefore should not always 
be avoided. Some people prefer to maintain their current level of uncertainty, rather than 
risk encountering a negative future uncertainty, by avoiding upsetting situations 
(Brashers et al, 2000). Others might seek a higher level of uncertainty if that uncertainty 
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offers them hope (Brashers et al, 2000).  
2.1.3 Communication Theory and Categories   
Purdy (1989), a PhD student of the University of Waterloo, studied the communication 
process as a function of the set structure in which it is embedded. She suggested that 
specifying an item, i.e. how much information has to be given to distinguish an item, is a 
function of the structure of the set. According to Purdy, a set has an internal structure 
based on groupings of its items that have subjective probabilities of choice associated 
with them. She theorized that as the similarity within a set increases, that is, as the items 
within a set become more alike, there are changes in the way messages are encoded.  
To investigate the issue, Purdy used a numbered 5x5 grid (Safayeni, 1975) to 
represent the psychological experience of how a person perceives items in the grid. She 
then defined similarity of the different positions in the grid as the number of steps that it 
takes to turn one square into another (“amount of transformation”, p. 12). The similarity 
measure was developed and validated for this particular stimulus. According to her, the 
more steps it takes to turn one object into another, the less similar are the two objects. 
Next she created sets of three locations, each embedded with a different degree of 
similarity. One location was targeted. Participants were then asked to write down all the 
different ways they could describe the target location to another person. She found that as 
similarity between the items in the set increases, the average number of different codes, 
or descriptions that can be used to distinguish one item from the set decreases. According 
to Purdy, as the similarity increases, the number of similar properties in the set increases. 
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distinguishing an item, hence, there are fewer properties that can be encoded. 
Purdy's research findings suggest that there are fewer ways to distinguish an item 
within a set of similar items than if the same item were in a set of dissimilar items. For 
example, if the set consists of three different things such as an apple, a key and a mug and 
a person is asked to write down all possible ways of distinguishing an apple, the result 
will be a very long list of different codes or descriptors. However, if the set contains three 
apples, the list decreases, because many of the descriptors used before will be of no use 
anymore.  
Tabatabai (2009) did a related study also at the University of Waterloo. She 
linked communication to categorical knowledge. She studied how technical and non-
technical people communicate to each other. According to Tabatabai, categorical sets 
between technical and non-technical people will have to match if they are to effectively 
communicate with each other. 
To study the phenomena, she designed a three-person task where participants 
communicated to each other through the use of categories. There were only two sets of 
numerical categories to be used – a broader set (big, small), and a narrower one (odd, 
even, prime, square root, cube root). The objective of the task was to communicate a 
randomly selected number from 1 to 10 from one person (A) to another person (C) using 
predefined cards representing the predefined categories. In the middle there was a 
translator (B), a middle-level knower who facilitated the communication process between 
those with technical (narrow) and non-technical (broad) knowledge. Nobody was allowed 
to talk or use body expression. Person (A) communicated the selected number to the 
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translator (B) using one of their cards (big/small). (B) translated the card to (C) using 
their own cards, also available to (C). (C), then, based on the cards s/he received from (B) 
guessed the number (from 1 to 10) and showed the answer to (A). Person (A) gave 
feedback to the translator (B) to indicate whether or not C had guessed correctly. This 
example illustrates how communication flows from the nontechnical (general categories) 
to the technical (narrowed categories) knowledge. In her experiment, the author 
investigated both directions. 
Tabatabai concluded that when people do not share the same categorical 
knowledge miscommunication happens. In order to understand each other, both 
communicators have to adjust their categorical sets. One of her findings was that group 
performance improved after the translator (B) created a third categorical set in addition to 
the two initial ones and used that to translate the number communicated from (A) to (C). 
 Finally, during my Masters’ Degree (Pimenta, 2011), I investigated how people 
communicate to each other in the context of structured and unstructured stimuli. I 
suggested that communication effectiveness is highly dependent on the degree of 
structure of the stimuli. 
To study the problem, I designed three experimental conditions2 where two people 
had to communicate to each other. Tasks 1 and 2 were designed with different stimuli but 
the same type of category structure – two different categorical attributes clearly 
identifiable by both participants. Shapes and sizes were used for task 1 and clothing items 
                                                      
2 There were 4 conditions and conditions 1 and 2 each had two different designs. Therefore, in total each 
pair of participants performed 5 rounds of tasks. Since condition 4 and the variants of conditions 1 and 2 
are not relevant for this study, I have not reported these in detail in the literature review.	
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and shades of blue for task 2. The objective of the tasks was to observe the effect of those 
known attributes on the communication process. 
Task 3 required a different sort of stimulus to study information in the context of 
a category structure with categories that were not well-defined, i.e. a set of cards in which 
no attributes would be intentionally obvious, therefore, I drew random lines on 6 white 
cards (See Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 – Random drawings 
The tasks were performed by groups of two participants. Each participant 
received a set of identical cards. One participant was instructed to make a sequence of 
their set of cards and then communicate that sequence to the other participant. Person 2 
followed verbal instructions from Person 1 to end up with the same sequence at task 
completion. They were allowed to talk about everything, but not show one another their 
cards.  
Analysis of the structured tasks showed that participants relied on the given 
attributes to communicate. Their presence helped participants to cluster the cards into 
sub-categories and to eliminate uncertainty as to which items in the set participants were 
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referring to. In the unstructured task, participants also relied on attributes to reduce 
uncertainty in communicating, but in the absence of known attributes, they needed to 
develop some of their own. When dealing with the unstructured stimulus, participants 
identified various attributes on the cards that enabled them to create sub-categories and 
distinguish certain cards from others. For example, some participants perceived the whole 
drawing or parts of the drawings as being similar to certain objects in the real world such 
as animals, tools, shapes, etc. Other participants distinguished items based on perceived 
properties of the drawings, such as the endpoints of the lines, the number of curves, etc. 
By drawing such distinctions, they were able to group the cards into smaller subsets and 
reduce the number of potential outcomes. In other words, they used similarity judgments 
to create the missing categories. Creating these categories reduced uncertainty in the 
communication task. 
2.2 Summary of the literature review on communication 
Studies such as the ones on Uncertainty Reduction Theory (URT) and Uncertainty 
Management Theory (UMT) bring contributions to both psychological and behavioral 
fields. But in those studies uncertainty is not connected with communication of an item. 
Uncertainty is not related to the cognitive processes involved in communication either. 
On the other hand, Purdy (1989), Tabatabai (2009) and Pimenta (2011) are examples of 
research that investigated the role of either a well-defined set of possibilities or an 
individual system of categories within the communication context. Purdy (1989) studied 
the communication process as a function of its set structure. Tabatabai (2009) linked 
communication to categorical knowledge by studying how technical and non-technical 
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people communicate to each other. Pimenta (2011) investigated how people 
communicate to each other in the context of unstructured stimuli. Although these studies 
bring important contributions to both communication and categorization fields there are 
still questions to be answered.  
According to Shannon a message is selected from a set of probable messages 
(Shannon, 1948). When the set of possibilities is not well-defined, uncertainty increases. 
In human communication what defines a set of possibilities are categories. If categories 
overlap, people experience a high level of uncertainty and communication becomes 
complicated. Therefore, during the communication process, both the sender and receiver 
of a message have to identify an attribute that allows them to make similarity judgments 
and to cluster items. In other words, the sender perceives a certain structure and 
highlights it to the receiver by clustering items. The investigation of this process is the 
focus of this work. 
2.3 Theoretical approaches to categorization   
Many studies have shown that we have a limited capacity for processing information 
(Macrae, C. N. and Bodenhausen, 2001), therefore we try to categorize received 
information based on attributes or characteristics. For instance, we categorize by 
clustering similar things together. We not only think in terms of categories but we also 
talk in categorical terms (Searle, 1998).  Hence, communication and categorization are 
interconnected.  
To categorize “means to recognize that certain things belong ‘together’” 
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(Rapoport, 1950), that they have common properties or characteristics and can be referred 
to as a group. As human beings, we all have the ability to categorize. Without that ability, 
we would be overwhelmed with all the information we get from the environment 
surrounding us. If we had to name each different thing we ever had contact with, 
language and communication would not be possible. 
Items are put together in the same category if they share at least one similar 
attribute. Different items such as a shirt, a star, and a triangle can be classified in the 
same category if they share at least one attribute in common, if they are all black, for 
instance. If they have no attributes in common they cannot belong to the same category. 
 Categories also provide means of distinguishing between items. If items are not in 
the same category, the reason for putting them in different categories implies a lack of 
similarity or a distinction between them with respect to some attribute. For instance, 
items such as white and black circles of the same size can be classified in two distinct 
subcategories: the subcategory of white circles and the subcategory of black circles. On 
one hand all items in the set are similar with respect to the attribute ‘shape’ (all items are 
circles) on the other hand some items are distinct from others with respect to the attribute 
‘colour’ (some items are white while others are black). In this example, ‘colour’ groups 
certain items within a subcategory (for instance, white items) and distinguishes those 
items from others outside the subcategory (non-white items).  
There are different views as to how these categories are formed. Next sections 
discuss the three most famous categorization views. I start with the Classic view. In 
general, studies in categorization are related to cognition and are not connected to 
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communication; therefore, I will not refer to the communication process except at the 
very end of the section. 
2.3.1 Classical View  
Until the 1970s, the prevailing theory on categorization was the classical view. According 
to the classic view, all instances of a concept share certain common properties, and these 
common properties are necessary and sufficient to define that concept. That is, possession 
of these properties distinguishes the members of a given category from non-members 
(necessary), and if something has these particular properties it must be a member 
(sufficient) (Smith and Medin, 1981). In other words, for the classical view, to categorize 
means to construct definitions (Murphy, 2002). 
The classic theory received several criticisms. For instance, using the category of 
games as an example, Wittgenstein (1953) questioned the possibility to define all 
concepts/categories in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient properties. A definition 
for game should include all games. But considering that activities such as those that are 
played by groups, those that are sports (like hunting), workouts, and throwing the ball 
against the wall are all called games what really defines a game? What is necessary and 
sufficient? Defining a concept implies determining membership discretely. In the real 
world, it is not that easy to identify whether or not things are in or out of a category. 
Many people find it difficult to determine whether an avocado is a fruit or a vegetable, 
for instance. Not only may different people disagree about whether or not certain items 
belong to a category, but an individual might change his mind if asked the same question 
after an interval of time (McCloskey and Glucksberg, 1978). 
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A second problem is that the Classical View assumes that all members of a 
category are equal. But, Rosch (1975) showed that categories may have graded 
structures, where people perceive some items as being more typical of a given category 
than others, meaning there may be better or worse examples of the category. Murphy 
(2002) describes typical members as the good examples of a category, or the ones we 
normally think of when we think of the category, whereas atypical members may be 
weaker examples of the category. Thus in North America, robin would be a typical 
example of the category bird and penguin an atypical one.  
Finally, Hampton (1982) points out some failures of transitivity, which can cause 
problems for those using the classical view. One advantage of the classical view is that it 
can explain how categories are hierarchically ordered. The classical view points out that 
if all X are Y, then the definition of Y must be included in the definition of X. For 
example, if all kitchen chairs are chairs, kitchen chairs must have four legs, have a back 
and arms, and be used for people to sit on, because that is the definition of a chair. This is 
the rule of transitivity. Hampton, however, found a number of cases in which people 
identify an item as a member of the subset category but not of the superordinate category. 
For example, subjects judged chairs as furniture and a car seat as a chair, but they did not 
consider a car seat to be furniture. By the rule of transitivity, if the car seat has the 
defining features of chair, and the chair has the defining features of furniture, both car 
seat and chair should be nested under furniture, since furniture should have the defining 
features of both. 
In summary, the classic view fails to explain human categorization for at least 
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three main reasons. First, it is not possible to find definitions that are necessary and 
sufficient to all concepts. Second, it does not explain the phenomena of typicality and 
unbounded membership. Third, it does not predict the existence of intransitive categories. 
Since Rosch’s empirical findings were fundamental to challenging the 
predominance of the classical view, the next section is dedicated to some of her studies as 
well as to some of the critics of her work. 
2.3.2 Prototype view  
Rosch was one of the main critics of the classical view and also provided much of the 
empirical findings that revealed its pitfalls. She pointed out that categories are ill-defined 
or “fuzzy”, not discrete entities as proposed by the traditional view. Rosch suggested that 
categories are organized around a set of clusters of correlated attributes that are only 
characteristic of category membership (Rosch, 1975). Therefore category membership is 
defined in terms of a gradient of membership, whereby some exemplars are more 
representative of a category than others. 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) developed a series of studies to investigate the internal 
structure of the categories organized around clusters of correlated attributes. In those 
studies, first they asked participants to list attributes for categories such as car, chair, and 
airplane. They then asked other people to perform typicality ratings. The researchers 
found that there were some listed attributes which were common to all members of the 
categories but that there were also many listed attributes which were not common to all 
members. 
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They also showed that the more typical members were those that had the most 
attributes in common with other members of the category. Rosch and Mervis gave the 
name ‘family resemblance’ to the empirically based, derived measurement of 
prototypicality in their studies. For a member of a category, family resemblance increases 
with the number of attributes it shares with members of its own category and decreases 
with the number of attributes it shares with other members of the contrasting categories. 
Using the family resemblance measurement and the empirical data, Rosch and her 
associates also introduced the concept of prototype (Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 1976). Prototype is “the clearest cases of 
category membership defined operationally by people’s judgment of goodness of 
membership in the category” (Rosch, 1978, p.36). For instance, in most cases “orange” is 
a better example than “olive” for the “fruit” category. Rosch and her associates proposed 
that category members were considered as the most prototypical ones when they bore the 
most family resemblance to their category, and the least family resemblance to other 
categories. In other words, the most prototypical members have more attributes which 
overlap with those of other members of their category, and fewer attributes which overlap 
with members of other categories. Family resemblance refers to relationships in which 
each item has at least one, and probably several, elements in common with one or more 
other items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items (Rosch and Mervis, 1975). 
Therefore, Rosch and Mervis postulated natural semantic categories as networks of 
overlapping attributes, where prototypical members would share more family 
resemblance within the category and least family resemblance across category.  
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Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) work should be read in the context of cognitive 
psychology. As Rosch clarifies in a later work (Rosch, 1978), her argument about family 
resemblance as a basis for categorization is related to cognitive economy. According to 
her, two principles regulate category formation: 1. the resultant system of categories has 
to provide the maximum information with the least cognitive effort; and 2. the perceived 
world has to come as structured information (not random attributes) (Rosch, 1978). Thus 
from the first principle it is possible to say that categorizing means maximizing 
information while saving resources, and from the second that categorizing involves 
organizing the world according to our perception of it.  
She also says that because categories do not always have clear-cut boundaries (i.e. 
members are not discretely separated) cognitive economy is achieved through prototypes 
or best representatives. Because a prototype has higher family resemblance with other 
members of a category, it affects dependent variables used as measures in psychological 
research. For instance, the speed with which subjects can judge statements about category 
membership (reaction time) is much faster for the items rated as prototypical than for 
atypical members. As mentioned before, family resemblance refers to the idea that 
members of a category may be related to one another not by one essential common 
feature but by a series of overlapping similarities, where no one feature is common to all 
members of the category (Rosch and Mervis, 1975).  
In this research, I will refer to the phenomenon of family resemblance later on and 
I will call it relative similarity. Two members of a category can be more or less similar to 
each other depending on the attributes they have in common. The problem is that, most 
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frequently, there are many attributes along which such members can be compared. Our 
minds have finite capacity to process information from the environment; hence creating 
categories is a way of handling information based on the classification of some attributes 
of received information (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2001). According to Rosch, cognitive 
economy can be achieved if common attributes are selected and things are grouped based 
on these attributes. One or more items are considered to belong to a category based on 
similar attributes so that the amount of information needed to distinguish them within 
their own category is maximized but the amount of information needed to distinguish 
them across categories is minimized (Rosch, 1978).  
Murphy (2002) states that according to the prototype view family resemblance 
categories should be noticed, because they create clusters of similar items in the 
environment. In addition, according to Murphy, proponents of the prototype theory would 
argue that the single dimension sorting is biased because it is task-dependent. The design 
of the tasks would override “the true category-construction processes that are found in the 
wild” (Murphy, 2002, p. 133). Interestingly, although the human mind has means to 
differentiate things with almost infinite details, it generally does not differentiate beyond 
what is necessary and reasonable in a given situation. For instance, unless necessary, we 
do not need to break a chair into its attributes: beam of wood with four legs, bunch of 
nails, backrest, arms on both sides, and so on, to come to identify it as a chair and not as 
something else. Except for a good reason, nobody would give this as description of a 
chair. Most probably if we see a new object that looks like a chair, we will make an 
overall comparison, a holistic similarity judgment relative to some chair-attribute and 
quickly come to the conclusion that it is a chair.  
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The context of this study is cognition and communication. More specifically, 
participants want to communicate an item from a set of items. If in cognitive studies 
categorization aids in the development of more permanent and stable structures, which 
can be retrieved from memory and used to make comparisons, in communication of new 
stimuli that is not possible. When two people are given a messy set of stimulus items and 
they have to communicate one item from that set, they make use of categorization 
processes to distinguish.  They perceive an attribute which allows them to judge how 
similar items are with respect to each other and, based on that attribute, they form two 
subcategories. That clustering or categorization is temporary. It is goal directed only, i.e. 
it is used to create the necessary categories in order to select the message to be 
communicated. As soon as the item is communicated, the categories might be forgotten.	
2.3.3 Exemplar view 
The exemplar view of categories was first formulated by Medin and Schaffer in 
1978. They argued against Rosch’s idea of a prototype as a unified representation of the 
category. For the followers of the exemplar view, the entire category is represented by 
multiple stored representations or a set of exemplars, rather than a separate representation 
for each member, or a prototype (Murphy, 2002). Membership judgments are made 
comparing new stimulus to those stored instances of the category. One’s concept of a 
chair is not a list of attributes that are found to a certain degree in chairs (as Rosch would 
argue) but a set of actual chairs that the person remembers. In other words, there is no 
prototype because there is no summary representation that stands for all chairs. 
The exemplar model proposes that every time a person encounters a particular 
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entity it leaves a trace in the person’s memory. Those traces accumulate over time and are 
used as mental references for comparison when the person categorizes new members. For 
example, an individual sees a new object in a room, s/he has to decide what that is. S/he 
sees it as quite similar to two or three objects that s/he knows about, fairly similar to a 
few more, and not too similar to many others. What s/he does is quickly consult her 
memory for which things it is most similar to and then makes a conclusion. Typicality 
effects are also accounted for in the exemplar approach. In its more extreme form, 
exemplar theory postulates that on each trial people perform some sort of global match 
between the representation of the stimulus they perceive and the memory representation 
they have of every exemplar of each category and to choose a response on the basis of 
these similarity computations (Brooks, 1978; Medin and Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 
1986). Compared to prototypes, exemplars can account faster for atypical category 
members, because an exemplar does not average out the characteristics of a category as 
the prototype does. They also can better explain variable categories such as “games” 
(categories with less distinguished characteristics) (Smith and Medin, 1981).  
2.4 Summary of the categorization approaches 
The theories reviewed in the field of categorization are all concerned with how categories 
are formed. The classical approach states that category membership can be discretely 
defined because categories contain singly necessary and jointly sufficient attributes. Both 
the prototype and exemplar views explain category membership based on perceived 
similarity. Prototype theory explains category membership by similarity to the category 
prototype (i.e. the member that shares the most attributes with other members of the 
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category and fewest attributes with members of contrasting categories). Exemplar theory, 
in turn, proposes that category judgments are made by comparing attributes of a new 
member with attributes of other exemplars encountered and stored in memory. Thus, both 
prototype theory and exemplar view emphasize the importance of relative similarity for 
categorization. Researchers from both approaches agree that categories maximize 
perceived similarity within categories and minimize perceived similarity between 
categories.  
2.5 Research on relative similarity 
Rosch and Mervis’ family resemblance categories have received many criticisms. Despite 
the plausibility of the family resemblance category-construction process and 
prototypicality theory, many empirical studies have demonstrated that categorization 
decisions are made based on a single attribute or dimension. For instance, Medin et al. 
(1987) reported a series of studies where people were given a set of stimulus items and 
asked to categorize them. According to Medin et al., the Rosch and Mervis (1975) 
measure of family resemblance accounts only for the frequency of the attribute, giving 
the same weight to all attributes or properties. Moreover, they state that “family 
resemblance traditionally has been defined in terms of matching and mismatching 
properties or attributes where the individual properties are treated as independent of and 
unrelated to each other” (p. 243). Therefore, to test categorization on the basis of family 
resemblance, Medin et al. (1987) varied the number of dimensions, the stimuli used and 
the instructions given to the participants in their initial experimental studies. For example, 
in one experiment, they varied every dimension with three different values. They used 
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dimensions such as bugs with tails that were long, medium and short, in equal numbers. 
Each bug was printed on a card. Then they asked participants to categorize the cards into 
two groups of equal size, so that single dimension categorization would be avoided. 
However, the authors reported that participants put the bugs with short tails into one 
category and the ones with long tails into another category. They then categorized the 
remaining cards into one of the previous categories by looking at the medium tailed bugs 
until noticing tiny differences in tail length. They concluded that, people have a strong 
preference to categorize things by a single dimension rather than by family resemblance 
as defined by Rosch. 
Regehr and Brooks (1995) also tried to prevent sorting by a single dimension. 
They used complex multidimensional shapes which could not be easily divided into 
single dimensions as stimuli. However they found that participants sorted items based on 
features that they arbitrarily identified in the stimuli. Those results are consistent with 
other studies (Martin and Caramazza, 1980; Milton and Wills, 2004). 
 Based on those results, Anh and Medin (1992) pointed out that Rosch’s family 
resemblance measurement treats the attributes of members as independent of each other 
(or unrelated to one another). According to them, the measurement also assigns equal 
weight to the different attributes, and therefore,, fails to be the natural way that people 
would categorize things as Rosch suggested it would be. Ahn and Medin (1992) designed 
a series of experiments to test the similarity-based model. They used a two-stage model. 
In stage 1, participants chose a salient feature on which to sort the stimuli into two 
categories. In stage 2, the remaining items were classified into one of the previous 
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categories based on relative similarity. For example, suppose participants created small 
vs. large categories and the rest of the items had a different dimension such as color. 
Participants would then have to create another basis for comparison regarding the initial 
categories so they could place the items in the more similar category. The authors 
concluded that, when there is no salient dimension in the stimulus, i.e. category structure 
is so complex that participants do not pay attention to any particular dimension, family 
resemblance categories can be formed. Similar results had been found and reported by 
Nosofsky et al, 1994. 
As can be seen, although family resemblance category formation seems to be a 
reasonable process, results from experimental studies point in a different direction. 
Family resemblance construction has been successful only under specific conditions such 
as very complex stimuli. In general, rather than utilising family resemblance, people 
prefer to sort items based on single dimensions. If this is true regarding psychological 
studies, the same should happen in communication studies.  
2.5.1 Relative Similarity in Cluster Analyses 
The concept of relative similarity has also been used in machine learning, specifically in 
cluster analysis, which is a procedure used to create a classification by creating clusters 
or groups of highly similar entities (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984). Entities in the 
same cluster are more similar to each other than they are to entities in other clusters. 
Researchers have developed various algorithms and similarity measures for use in cluster 
analysis. Each of those algorithms has its own notion of what a cluster means and how it 
is formed. For example, in centroid-based clusters, such as K-means, clusters are 
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represented by a central vector, which may not be a member of the data set. The 
algorithm itself is quite simple. First it is necessary to select K initial centroids, where K 
is the number of clusters desired and has to be specified by the user. Each point is then 
assigned to the closest centroid, and each collection of points assigned to a centroid forms 
a cluster. The centroid of each cluster is then updated and the steps are repeated until the 
centroids remain the same (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990). Agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering, on the other hand, connect points to form clusters based on their distances. 
The agglomerative hierarchical clustering starts with the points as individual clusters and, 
at each step, merges the closest pair of clusters. The key step for hierarchical clustering is 
to define the computation of the proximity between clusters (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 
1984).  
Clustering has been used in different disciplines and with a variety of data. 
Documents are hierarchically clustered for efficient information access (Sahami, 1998) or 
retrieval (Bhatia and Deogun, 1998). Clustering is also used in marketing to group 
customers into different segments (Reuterrer et al, 2006; Cooil et al, 2007). In computer 
science, clustering can be used to divide a digital image into distinct regions for object 
recognition (Dorai and Jain, 1995), and to design recommender systems, i.e. systems that 
can predict a user’s preference based on the preferences of other users in the user’s 
cluster (Lee and Kwon, 2014).   
No doubt these studies on cluster analyses contribute to their respective fields of 
knowledge. Clustering analysis is very useful when there is a need to classify abundant 
information into meaningful clusters. Moreover clustering algorithms classify various 
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groups and variables at the same time. For example, different people can be classified 
into different clusters according to their incomes, level of education, gender, and so on. 
However, clustering analyses have limitations. Because of the different criterion of 
merging clusters, different methods of clustering give different results. More importantly, 
cluster analysis studies do not help to understand what structure is and how it is 
cognitively developed during the communication process. 
2.5.2 Relative Similarity in a Communication Study 
Tabatabai (2014) designed a series of experiments to study how categorical knowledge 
affects the learning of categories and communication. She examined how differences in 
the structure of categories affect the processing of information in category learning and in 
the communication of the learned categories. In her experiments, participants learned 
about categories of flowers from two different geographic regions. Category structure 
was defined in terms of the variability of items within the categories, a concept closely 
related to relative similarity. The flowers were either from a “simple” categorical 
structure (low within and high between variability) or from a “complex” categorical 
structure (high within and low between variability).  
Three different experiments were designed to test hypotheses. To test the learning 
and communication process of the categories with different structure, participants learned 
about the flowers of the two regions in a supervised learning situation. Then they were 
separated into two groups. One group was presented with a simple set of flowers and the 
other group with a complex set. Next, they were asked to guess the origin of the flowers 
and to explain to which features they had paid attention. Finally, they were instructed to 
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write instructions on how to distinguish between the flowers of the two regions. To 
measure the degree of effectiveness of the communication process of the learned 
categories, Tabatabai designed a second experiment in which participants learned about 
the flowers from the two different regions from the written instructions provided by 
experiment 1. Finally, to investigate the communication process between a person who 
learned a set of simple categories and a person who learned a set with complex 
categories, the author used an experiment similar to the first one. The third experiment 
differed from the first one only with respect to the written instructions. While in the first 
experiment each participant wrote their own instructions, in the third experiment one 
participant from the simple condition and one participant from the complex condition 
wrote the instructions on how to distinguish the flowers from the two regions in 
collaboration.  
Tabatabai found that the structure of the categories influenced the number of 
features that the participants paid attention to. Participants who learned the complex 
categorical structure had to pay attention to more features than those who learned the 
simple structure. Second, participants who learned the more complex structure were less 
effective during the communication process. Finally, during interaction, participants who 
learned the simple categorical structure were more convincing about their knowledge 
than participants who learned the more complex one.  
Most of the cognitive and/or psychological studies have focused on the process of 
category learning (Murphy (2002). Tabatabai (2014) is perhaps an exception. Although 
her studies are centered on category learning, they included communication. This allowed 
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the author to draw some conclusions about the structure of learned categories and effects 
in some communication settings. However, the type of questions Tabatabai was 
concerned with was different from those which I am interested in. In this research I am 
concerned with how people communicate a target from an ambiguous set of items. The 
concept of relative similarity is important because in order to communicate a target, 
people have to distinguish the target first. People perceive different ways to cluster the 
target based on the relative similarity between the target and the other items.   
2.6 Summary  
In sum, although all the studies cited above are good contributions for the categorization 
literature, they all have a similar approach to the concepts of relative similarity, 
categories and attributes. It might be possible that in studies of categorization and 
cognition, such as those by Rosch and Mervis (1975), the categories formed are more 
stable or permanent. In that case, perception of an overall prototype would make sense. In 
the context of communication, however, the categories formed are not necessarily of the 
same sort, i.e., they do not need to be permanently learned. 
In communication I would argue that categories are more ad hoc and goal 
oriented in the sense that they are formed by people to accomplish their immediate 
communication goals (Barsalou, 1983). For communication purposes, we do not need to 
process information coming from all the attributes. Since we can only refer to one thing 
at a time, if we were to communicate information based on an overall prototype 
representation, communication would not be efficient. Therefore, information is 
processed by paying attention only to the one attribute that allows for reducing the 
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highest amount of uncertainty given a situation. To my knowledge, there is no literature 
investigating this issue. 
In addition, most studies on how categories are formed, including those of Rosch, 
are conducted in ways that are disconnected from the communication context. For 
instance, a great amount of research on concepts has focused on the process of learning to 
categorize. Little exists on how people use categories and processes of categorization to 
communicate and process information. This current study aims to elaborate on this point.  
In this research, I propose a different approach to relative similarity. I assume that 
when people have to communicate about stimuli that are not well defined, they use 
relative similarity to cluster items into smaller subsets. I propose that items are 
categorized based on perceived relative similarity, whereby similarity is maximized 
within categories and minimized between categories with respect to one attribute. 
Further, I postulate that when multiple attributes are involved, the sender perceives 
various ways of clustering the target item based on how similar/dissimilar it is with 
respect to the set of items. In addition, I postulate that when dealing with multiple 
perceived attributes, sender and receiver of the message have to choose the attribute that 
best distinguishes the target item from the other items in the set. I hypothesize that this 
attribute is the one that 1. maximizes the difference between the cluster which contains 
the target and the cluster of the other items, and 2. reduces the set as efficiently as 
possible to a subset of 1 (the target). These ideas will be developed in detail in the next 
sections. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Framework 
The research framework discusses how structure is developed in the context of 
communication; I draw on Communication Theory developed by Shannon (1948), which 
relates to information and uncertainty reduction in communication. This research also 
draws on Rosch and her associates’ concept of relative similarity (or family resemblance, 
as in Rosch and Mervis, 1975). Shannon’s Information Theory is used to analyze how 
information works to reduce uncertainty through the development of structure; I 
conceptualize this in terms of a system of categories. Relative similarity is used to 
explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in the development of those categories. 
3.1 Communication and relative similarity 
In this work, I apply Shannon’s concepts of uncertainty and information to human 
communication. Shannon’s Information Theory (1948) was developed to improve the 
transmission of a message from a sender to a receiver by both increasing channel capacity 
and decreasing noise of communication systems. Shannon’s description of uncertainty 
can be understood as what a person experiences before learning the outcome of a 
probabilistic process and information as anything that reduces uncertainty. In Information 
Theory, information is measured in bits. One bit of information is the amount of 
information that reduces the number of equally likely outcomes by half. Bits are binary 
digits that can be represented by 1s or 0s.  
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According to Shannon, a message is selected from a set of possibilities. As 
human beings we do not organize the world through the use of 1s and 0s, we categorize. 
Our set of possibilities is therefore the way we categorize things. Categories allow 
uncertainty to be reduced in the same way that 1s and 0s do. As shown with the money in 
the box example in the introduction lefts and rights were equivalent to 1s and 0s in 
Information Theory. Each time the experimenter answered Yes/No for the participant 
question “whether or not the money was on the boxes on the left side?” uncertainty was 
reduced because half of the boxes was eliminated. The presence of categories reduces 
uncertainty regarding how to refer to one item within a set of items. However, categories 
are not always known. In human communication, categories are the pre-defined set of 
possibilities necessary for information to be conveyed and uncertainty to be reduced. 
Hence, if the set is not structured, i.e., if the categories are unknown, some structure has 
to be developed so that communication happens. 
 In addition to Shannon’s theory, in this research, I draw on Rosch and Mervis’ 
(1975) concept of relative similarity. I propose that when people have to communicate 
ambiguous stimuli they use relative similarity to develop categories, i.e., to create 
structure. Relative similarity refers to Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) concept of family 
resemblance. According to the authors, categories maximize perceived similarity among 
category members and minimize perceived similarity across contrasting category 
members. Rather than using the authors’ overall-similarity approach to categorization, in 
this research, relative similarity is defined with respect to a single attribute. By attribute I 
mean any basis for categorizing an item, which could include perceived overall 
similarity, or sharing just one perceived feature in common. Having categorized the item 
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a certain way, this attribute then becomes a single dimension along which relative 
degrees of similarity for different items can be compared.  
As mentioned in the literature review, Rosch and Mervis’ theory of family 
resemblance was developed in the context of understanding cognitive processes involved 
in conceptual categorization. Categories in cognition are relatively stable and permanent. 
Therefore forming categories based on the overall-similarity of items in a category might 
make sense in the context of cognitive categorization, in which category structures are 
formed, stored, and are ready for retrieval repeatedly when needed. In this work I am not 
concerned with the repeated retrieval of information from a stable, permanent set of 
conceptual categories. This work investigates how people communicate one item from a 
set of ambiguous items for which a set of pre-conceived categories is not available. For 
this specific communication purpose, the use of categorization processes is different from 
that studied by Rosch and Mervis’ (1975). I propose that people take advantage of the 
perceived structure of the ambiguous stimulus and form categories in a goal-oriented 
manner; this is done in order to distinguish the target item from other items in the set and 
to communicate these differences with greater efficacy. With this method of 
categorization, the categories developed might not be permanent. Judgments of 
similarities are used to create goal-directed categories that enable information processing 
by distinguishing the target from other items in the set. To form such goal-directed 
categories, people focus on whatever attributes best enable them to distinguish the target 
item from the others (Barsalou, 1983).  
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In this thesis, the words feature, attribute, dimension, and category are used 
interchangeably and with a broader meaning than usually given in the literature. Tversky 
(1977), for example states that features or attributes are characteristics of objects. Rosch 
(1978) defines categories as “a number of objects that are considered equivalent” usually 
designated by names such as dog, animal (p.4). Similar to Tversky, Rosch also considers 
attributes as characteristics of the categories. In this study category and attribute are 
understood as “analytically equivalent” (Ran and Duimering, 2007, p.159). A person 
decides to categorize items together based on some characteristic or attribute that makes 
them similar. In doing so, those items in the category have in common the fact that they 
all share the same attribute; the attribute becomes the definition of the category. Hence, 
attribute and category are analytically equivalent in how we use them for communication 
purposes. Moreover, a person perceives a similarity with respect to ‘something’. The 
basis for that ‘something’ could be some sort of complicated overall similarity (computed 
across shared features), some holistic gestalt similarity or a single feature similarity. No 
matter what the basis is for this ‘something’, once it is perceived, that something becomes 
the attribute. Therefore, feature, attribute, dimension, and category are used as synonyms 
and refer not to an inherent property of an object but to any basis that can categorize or 
distinguish an item from a set of items. Whether someone compares items based on 
perceived overall similarity or similarity of a single feature, once the basis for 
comparison is perceived it becomes the attribute. 
Note I am not arguing that possession of a specific attribute is identical to 
overall similarity between two items or a perceived resemblance between an item and 
some third thing such as a mental image, a category prototype etc. I am simply arguing 
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that any of these bases for categorization can be used to draw distinctions among a set of 
ambiguous items for the purpose of information processing in communication. So as a 
short hand, I use the term attribute in general to refer to any of these various ways of 
drawing distinctions as a basis for categorization. I also use the word similarity in a 
general way to refer to various perceptual processes associated with perceiving such 
distinctions. For instance, perceiving that two or more ambiguous items may share a 
common feature or bare an overall resemblance to one another or a similarity to some 
thing else such as an image or an object in the world.  
3.2 Communication and structure 
3.2.1 Communicating an item from a structured set   
The following shows a simplified example to explain the above concepts in a 
communication context. Suppose two people were given a structured set of cards, such as 
the triangles and circles of varying sizes shown in Figure 2 and one of them was asked to 
randomly select one of the items of the set and communicate that item to the other 
person. The sender of the message wants to communicate item 1. In this specific case, the 
sender has no problem selecting the item and in referring to it as a triangle while 
communicating to the other person. There is a definite set of items, 6 shapes; both people 
know how to refer to the different items – they are triangles or circles in different sizes. 
In other words, the categories (triangles/circles in their different sizes) needed for 
effective communication are already available to both people. I am calling this example 
structured because both sender and receiver can readily identify the subcategories based 
on the attributes of shape and size.  
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Figure 2 – Structured set 
 During the communication process, more structure means less uncertainty. Both 
people perceive without a doubt that there are certain shapes that are more similar to 
triangles and others that are not similar. The sender has no uncertainty regarding how to 
refer to an item. If s/he wants to communicate item 1, s/he refers to it as a triangle. On the 
other hand, the receiver has no uncertainty with respect to what a triangle is. All the cards 
one person perceives as triangles are the same ones the other person perceives as 
triangles. Due to the perception of a sharp distinction separating the two categories, there 
is no category overlap. The receiver uncertainty is only with respect to the outcome, i.e. 
which item within the possible items. The sender communicated a triangle. The receiver 
clusters their items into subsets of triangles (3 items) and non-triangles (3 items). 
According to Shannon, since the set decreased from 6 to 3, uncertainty was reduced by 
half. After the first attribute is used to reduce uncertainty and the two subcategories are 
formed, that attribute is of no further use to reduce the remaining uncertainty. To reduce 
S1 S2
Item 3




S1 = subset 1
S2 = subset 2
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the remaining uncertainty, the sender of the message must select a new attribute to base 
their similarity judgments on.  
 In general terms, when people have to communicate a target item from a set of 
items, as in Figure 2, they use judgments of similarity to categorize those items. In this 
study, relative similarity relates to the relative probability of an item being perceived as a 
member of a specific category. Given a certain attribute along which it is possible to 
evaluate the similarity of a set of items, similarity judgments can be represented as a 
probability distribution reflecting the relative probability of perceiving the item in a given 
category.  
 Suppose different individuals are looking at the set of items shown in figure 2. If 
we ask these individuals to judge similarity of those items based on the attribute triangle, 
we would expect these ratings to form a probability distribution similar to the one in 
Table 1 below, with a 100% chance of items 1-3 being grouped as triangles, because 
people perceive those items as highly similar to triangles, and 0% chance of the items 4-6 
being grouped with the triangles, because people perceive circles as dissimilar from 
triangles.  







Table 1 – Probability of items being perceived as a triangle 
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In this case, the boundary between the two categories (triangles and non-
triangles) is very clear, with a very large gap separating them. I use the term ‘gap’ in this 
example to refer to the difference between the probability of people perceiving items 1, 2, 
and 3 as a triangle and the probability of people perceiving items 4, 5, 6 as a triangle. 
More specifically, the term gap is used in relation to probability distributions like the one 
in table 1 to refer to the difference in probability between the “least triangle” member of 
the triangle category (item 3 in this example) and the “most triangle” member of the non-
triangle category (item 4 in this example). This will be more apparent in later examples 
where the boundaries between categories are not as sharply defined. In terms of 
perception, the gap relates to the individual perception of a sharp distinction between two 
clusters: triangles and non-triangles. In this specific example, the large gap (100%) 
corresponds with a person’s perception of the items as clustering into two distinct 
subsets: triangles and circles. The perception of such a sharp, clear distinction can be 
interpreted as evidence of structure.  
After clustering the items in figure 2 according to shape, we can say that the 
degree of similarity of the items within both subcategories is equally high (approximately 
the same), i.e. the triangles are very similar to one another and the non-triangles (circles) 
are also very similar to one another. On the other hand the similarity between the 
triangles and the circles is very low. Therefore, categorizing the items this way tends to 
maximize the similarity within the categories and minimize the similarity between 
categories. 
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According to Shannon’s Information Theory, information conveyed in 
communication reduces uncertainty relative to a predefined set of possibilities. Hence, if 
there is no structure, information can only be conveyed and uncertainty reduced after 
some structure is created to define the set of possibilities. I draw on Rosch and Mervis’ 
(1975) concept of relative similarity to propose that people use similarity judgments to 
create structure by dividing a complex unstructured stimulus into a set of categories. 
More structure means less uncertainty when people communicate an item from a 
set of items. Structured sets are those in which both people perceive certain attributes and 
both know how to refer to them. People use judgments of relative similarity to categorize 
items of a set. They perceive, with respect to a certain attribute, that some items in a set 
share high similarity to each other and low similarity to others. During the 
communication process, the sender has no uncertainty with respect to which category the 
item belongs to. The receiver uncertainty, regarding which item within the set of possible 
items is the selected item, is also very little. 
However, structured sets of items are rare. In the real world, people have to 
communicate ambiguous items. When sets are unstructured, the sender and receiver of 
the message may disagree regarding to which category an item belongs. Therefore, 
communicating unstructured sets will not be as easy as communicating structured sets.  
3.2.2 Communicating an item from an unstructured set 
The preceding example considers communication of an item from structured sets. The 
general idea suggests that to communicate one item, given an initial set of items, people 
will first create sub-categories based on judgments of similarity relative to one perceived 
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attribute.  Consider a new set of items such as in figure 3. Compared to the figure 2 set, 
this set has a different degree of structure, i.e. the gap separating one subset from the 
other does not allow for the same sharp distinction. Items within the set cannot be 
clustered discretely in triangles and circles (non-triangles) but instead there are 
overlapping categories. Suppose that, one person is asked to communicate item 7 to 
another person. The sender decides to refer to item 7 as a triangle. In order to identify 
which one of the 7 items is the referred triangle, the receiver clusters their items into 
triangles and non-triangles. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Less structured set 
 Since the set of items contains triangles, circles, as well as boundary items that 
have attributes similar to both triangles and circles (straight lines forming an angle on one 
S1 = subset 1
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side, and curvilinear on the other side) the receiver might perceive item 7 as either a 
triangle or a circle. For the sake of the argument, suppose we have asked a group of 
people to judge the similarity of these items with respect to the attribute triangle. Since 
items 6 and 7 are boundary items, compared to the previous probability distribution, we 
would expect the following differences (see Table 2). 
 








Table 2 – Probability of items being perceived as a triangle 
 In Table 1, there was a sharp gap, i.e. the difference between the probability of 
the least triangle being perceived as a triangle (100) and the probability of the most non-
triangle being perceived as a triangle (0) was very clear (100 – 0). In Table 2 there is no 
clear gap between the triangles and non-triangles. Instead the two categories overlap. The 
probability of items 1 and 2 being perceived as a triangle is 100%, the probability of 
items 3, 4, and 5 being perceived as a triangle is 0%, and the probability of the boundary 
items 6 and 7 being perceived as a triangle is 50%. That is to say that the gap between the 
categories of triangles and non-triangles is not as sharp as it was before (now only a 
probability difference of 50% rather than 100%).  
Therefore, less structure means more uncertainty. Individuals may not agree on 
whether or not an item belongs to the same category. For instance, if the sender describes 
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item 7 as a triangle but the receiver perceives only items 1, and 2 as triangles 
miscommunication will result. When categories overlap the sender experiences 
uncertainty about how to refer to an item. In this case, the attributes of triangles and 
circles do not work as reliable codes anymore. The sender can refer to item 7 equally as 
triangle or circle. On the other hand, the receiver also experiences uncertainty regarding 
which item within the set of items is the one being referred to. Depending on the sender’s 
choice of attribute, the receiver has also 50% probability of getting it right. Therefore, the 
level of uncertainty is much higher than in structured sets.  
Although the size of gap is not as large as in the previous example, there is a 
certain amount of uncertainty being reduced. By communicating item 7 as a triangle, the 
initial set is reduced from 7 items to 4. 3 items (items 3, 4, and 5) are eliminated. People 
perceive the distinction between items 2 and 6, and between items 7 and 3, but there is 
some uncertainty about whether 6 and 7 are included in the triangle or the non-triangle 
categories.  
In addition, this example raises the idea of the position of the gap, i.e., where the 
gap is located on the continuum. In the example in Figure 2, there was a sharp gap 
between triangles and non-triangles and a fixed location for the gap in the continuum. 
People perceived a clear distinction between triangles and non-triangles. In the Figure 3 
example, the distinction is not obvious anymore. The boundaries are now fuzzy. There is 
uncertainty regarding where the gap should be located. By varying the gap position in the 
continuum, different amounts of uncertainty is reduced. Three out of the seven items are 
eliminated by one position and five out of the seven are eliminated by the other position.  
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 The example above illustrates how the process of communication becomes more 
complex when attributes overlap.  
3.2.3 Communication process and the development of structure 
In the previous section I used simple examples to illustrate how communication is 
affected when people deal with sets with different degrees of structure. As we considered 
before, in structured sets the level of uncertainty is minimal because both the sender and 
receiver of the message know how to refer to the items. Categories are easily perceived, 
allowing for clustering and therefore reduction in the sender uncertainty regarding the 
best choice of attribute with which to encode the message. In these structured sets, the 
receiver has no difficulty in decoding the message regarding which item within the set is 
being communicated. In unstructured sets, however, both the sender and receiver 
experience uncertainty. The sender does not how to refer to the item. The receiver does 
not know which item from the set of items is the item being communicated. Since 
categories are not clear, the sender might encode an item as belonging to category A and 
the receiver might decode it as belonging to category B. To decrease the sender 
uncertainty, it is necessary to create smaller subsets or subcategories, in other words, to 
build structure. Therefore, communication is highly dependent on structure.  
To better explain how structure in communication is developed, I will discuss 
the third experiment performed by participants during my Masters’ Degree (Pimenta, 
2011). I described the experiment in detail in the literature review. As I pointed out, 
during the communication process, it was very difficult for participants to refer to the set 
of items shown on Figure 4 given that the cards had only random lines drawn on them. 
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Participants did not have known or well-defined categories to rely on. They had to 
develop these structural categories step by step.  
Figure 4 – Random lines numbered 
Individuals performing the task perceived distinctive attributes on the cards by 
associating the entire drawing, or parts of it, with objects from the real world. For 
example, parts of two cards were identified as wrenches, some cards were identified as 
rounded, others were called boots, dogs, a fetus, and so on. 
Each time the communicators judged their cards to be similar, they created the 
missing categories needed for effective communication. If both communicators identified 
the same card as the fetus, for instance, they broke the set of cards into two smaller 
subsets, the set of 1 fetus card and the set of 5 non-fetus cards. They could then use those 
categories effectively in their communication just as triangles and circles were used in the 
 
Card	1 Card	2 Card	3 
Card	6 Card	5 Card	4 
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earlier examples. In other words, they created a structure that was not defined before. 
Both of them share the same structure of subcategories in this case, i.e. fetus and non-
fetus.  
However, the two people communicating did not always identify the same card 
as the fetus, that is, different people formed different structures. It was possible that the 
sender perceived card 1 as the fetus while the receiver identified card 2 as the fetus. In 
this case, although it might seem for both of them that they had two smaller subsets, fetus 
and non-fetus, their subsets or subcategories did not correspond. In a different situation, 
the sender might have perceived card 1 as the fetus while the receiver thinks that cards 1 
and 2 are both fetus-like. Hence, the sender had a subset of 1 fetus and the receiver had a 
subset of 2 fetuses. Or yet, the receiver did not see any fetus – thus any of the 6 cards 
could be the fetus for the receiver. In all those cases, the sender and the receiver would 
not have the same subsets. As a consequence describing card 1 as “fetus” would not be 
effective.   
 Another example of how communicators grouped their cards into subcategories 
is the following. Participants perceived some of the cards as being circular or round. 
However, as with the fetus example, communicators differed on their judgments and in 
their perceptions of whether or not an item was round. Because there was no clear-cut 
boundary between round items and non-round items, some people found 2 cards more 
circular (any 2 among cards 1, 2, 3, 4), many saw 3 (any 3 among cards 1, 2, 3, 4), while 
others, 4 cards (cards 1, 2, 3, 4).  Therefore, categories overlapped with respect to the 
attribute of roundness. The two people formed quite different subsets of cards, which 
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means that they did not necessarily talk about the same card, though they thought they 
did. 
It is worth comparing the current fetus and roundness examples to the earlier 
triangle and circle examples. In both cases I argue that judgments of relative similarity 
are used to reduce uncertainty by placing items into subcategories. In the first 
triangle/circle example, attributes were crisply structured and both people shared the 
same structure and had no difficulty categorizing the items. On the other hand, when 
attributes are unstructured, as with the boundary items in the second, less structured 
triangle/circle example and in the current fetus/roundness examples, categories overlap 
and uncertainty increases as communicators are unsure of how to refer to the items.  
To summarize, when people have to refer to one item among a set of items they 
have to handle uncertainty. There are two sources of uncertainty associated with 
overlapping categories, the sender uncertainty regarding the encoding of the message and 
the receiver uncertainty regarding which item in the possible set of items is the one being 
referred to. Handling uncertainty in unstructured sets means not only dealing with the 
receiver uncertainty but also with the sender uncertainty. In the unstructured sets, clearly 
defined subcategories are not available. Therefore, judgments of relative similarity have 
to be used to develop those subcategories and build structure. The sender and the receiver 
uncertainty are reduced when subcategories are available.  
In section 3.2.1, I have assumed that people attempt to maximize similarity 
within the category and minimize it between the categories when communicating 
structured sets. I argue that similarity is relative to the one perceived attribute that 
  52 
maximizes distinction between the subsets. Some basis for judging similarity is chosen to 
maximize the distinctiveness of the target item. This then becomes the single attribute 
used, both to refer to the item and to divide the set into subsets. In addition, relative 
similarity relates to the relative probability of an item being perceived as a member of a 
specific category. To illustrate relative similarity, I started with a two-dimensional 
structured set: i.e. a set of items in which only shapes and size were needed to 
communicate the items efficiently. I assumed that people would start dividing their cards 
into two subsets of different shapes (triangles/circles), not sizes (small/big). In other 
words, no choice between the two dimensions was taken into account3.  However, when 
dealing with multiple dimensions, people deal with choice. For instance, if they have a 
set of items varying in terms of shape and colour, some people might choose to cluster 
items first in terms of color while others might choose to do so in terms of shape. In cases 
of unstructured sets in which attributes overlap and uncertainty is higher, both sender and 
receiver experience difficulty in choosing among multiple perceived attributes. The 
sender must choose the best alternative regarding how to refer to an item and the receiver 
has to choose the best alternative regarding which item within the possible items is the 
one being referred to. I propose that to reduce both types of uncertainty two different 
categorization logics operate: one related to the size of the gap, and another one related to 
the gap location in the similarity continuum.  
                                                      
3	 In section 3.2.2., I touched very briefly on the notion of choice of attributes while introducing the 
concept of gap position.	
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3.3 Categorization logics 
As I pointed out earlier in the literature review as well as in the above examples, 
judgments of similarity are made with respect to one attribute. I also have mentioned that, 
during the communication of one item from a set of unstructured items, both sender and 
receiver of the message deal with uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty is higher when 
communicating an item from an unstructured set because the attributes overlap. 
Uncertainty is reduced when sender and receiver of the message perceive an attribute 
which allow them to cluster items through similarity judgments. I postulate that when 
dealing with multiple attributes the sender and receiver of a message have a choice of one 
attribute over others in order to reduce their uncertainties. In other words, when dealing 
with multiple attributes people will choose one that maximizes information processing.  
When dealing with structured sets, people perceive that items are more similar to 
others and therefore in order to distinguish an item they create subcategories. Because the 
attributes are well defined, the sender of the message has no uncertainty regarding how to 
refer to an item.  The receiver has little uncertainty regarding which item is referred to 
from the set of possible items. Therefore, in structured sets, the attribute reduces 
uncertainty regarding which category the item belongs to and regarding the item within 
the possible items being referred to. For example, when the sender of the message 
communicates a triangle, since the receiver knows what a triangle looks like, there is no 
uncertainty with respect to the subcategory being referred to. There is sharp distinction 
(i.e. a large gap) between the two subcategories (triangle/circle).  
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Unstructured sets might differ as uncertainty in those sets is higher. Different 
attributes might be associated with different methods of achieving maximal information 
processing. One attribute may be associated with creating two well-defined 
subcategories, and judging similarity based on that attribute allows for a nice, sharp gap 
along the continuum. On the other hand, the choice of another attribute might influence 
where the gap is located along the similarity continuum. In this case, the attribute chosen 
could allow the division of the set into subsets of different sizes. Information is 
transmitted because, each time there is a division into subsets, the number of items 
decreases. However, there is less information gain with respect to developing well-
defined subcategories or structure to the set if the boundary between the resulting subsets 
is not sharply defined. 
Both attributes “round” and “fetus” (see figure 4) are examples of information 
gain due to both the size of the gap and the position of the gap. However, the choice of 
“fetus” as the communicated attribute results in greater information gain (more 
uncertainty reduction) than the choice of the “round” attribute.  
3.3.1 “Round” attribute 
The sender wants to communicate card 1. As mentioned before, card 1 was perceived as 
“round” but it was also perceived as a “fetus”. The choice of one attribute is more 
efficient than the other. Let us consider each attribute option separately, starting with the 
attribute “round”. 
 By choosing to communicate it as round, the sender could have a subset of 4 
cards similar to round (cards 1, 2, 3, 4) and two cards not similar to round (cards 5, 6). 
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For the sake of the argument, suppose we have asked a group of people to make 
similarity judgments of cards 1 to 6 with respect to how similar they were with respect to 
the attribute roundness and we have gotten the following probability distribution as a 
result (Table 3).  







Table 3 – Probability of cards being perceived as round 
Based on the probability distribution (Table 3) we would expect more agreement 
among people while judging cards 3, 2, and 1 with respect to the degree of roundness (a 
relatively continuous distribution), and would expect an amount of disagreement between 
cards 1 and 4 (a jump in the distribution), but not yet enough to say with certainty that 
card number 4 does not belong to the cluster anymore. A 55% chance means that the card 
is borderline, still similar enough to cause perceptual uncertainty.  
The size of the gap between cards 3 and 2 varies by only 4% (99 – 95), between 
cards 2 and 1 by 7% (95 – 88). Finally, between cards 1 and 4 the gap size increases to 
33% (88 – 55). In similarity terms it means that with respect to the attribute roundness, 
cards 3 and 2 share almost the same degree of similarity as cards 2 and 1. Then between 
cards 2 and 1 and cards 1 and 4, the similarity of the first pair is higher than the similarity 
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of the second which indicates that people would have doubt whether or not to include 
card 4 in the subset.  
Between cards 4 and 5 there is a gap of 35% (55 – 10). Because that variation is 
almost the same as the previous variation it does not help people to reduce their 
uncertainty about where the boundary is set (see Table 4). That is to say, if with respect 
to the attribute roundness people perceived card 5 as more similar to card 4, the boundary 
would be perceived after the third card, resulting in the subset of round (3, 2, 1) and non-
round (4, 5, 6) cards. However, because the degree of similarity between cards 4 and 5 is 
almost the same as between cards 1 and 4, people still do not know in which subset card 
4 goes. In this case there is no sharp gap that allows for a reliable separation along the 
continuum of round/non-round cards.  
To summarize, the gap could be perceived as after card 3 or after card 4. In the 
first case, the subset round would contain cards 1, 2, and 3. In the second case, the subset 
round would have cards 1, 2, 3, and 4. With either, the size of the gap reduces some 
uncertainty – as cards 5 and 6 are eliminated from the initial set. But as a fuzzy boundary 
is perceived there is still uncertainty remaining.  
Comparison between cards with respect to roundness 
  Cards 3 and 2 Cards 2 and 4 Cards 4 and 1 Cards 1 and 5 
Gap 0.04 0.07 0.33 0.35 
Within similarity  High High Low Low 
Between similarity Low Low High High 
Table 4 – Round cards with respect to gap and relative similarity 
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 With respect to the position of the gap, since the perception of the boundary was 
fuzzy, there were two possible positions. The first resulted in information gain 
(uncertainty reduction) by eliminating 2 out of the 6 initial outcomes. The second, by 
eliminating 3 out of 6. Since the smaller the subset remaining, the more informative it is; 
the second option is better than the first.  
 To summarize, since the attribute round does not allow for perception of a sharp 
gap, there is no clear boundary between subcategories. The size of the gap reduces some 
uncertainty, but there is still remaining uncertainty. Based on the position of the gap, the 
initial subset can be decreased from 6 cards to 3, or from 6 to 4. Therefore, if the goal is 
to communicate card 1, by choosing the attribute “round” and creating two subcategories 
of 3 cards versus 3 cards, or 2 versus 4, a certain amount of uncertainty is reduced. 
3.3.2 “Fetus” attribute    
By choosing to communicate card 1 as a fetus, the sender has a subset of one card similar 
to a fetus (card 1) and another subset of five cards not similar to a fetus (cards 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6). For the sake of the argument, suppose that we have asked a separate group of people 
to judge the degree of similarity of the 6 cards in Figure 6 with respect to a “fetus”, and 
as a result we obtained the probability distributions in Table 5. In this case most 
individuals perceive card 1 as most similar to a fetus. Some people found that card 2 
resembled a fetus, but with a lower degree of similarity than card 1. According to the 
probability distribution in table 5, we would expect that with respect to the attribute fetus, 
the sender and the receiver would most likely perceive the boundary separating subsets 
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between cards 1 and 2, creating the categories of fetus (card 1) and non-fetus (cards 2 to 
6).  
 







Table 5 – Probability of the cards being perceived as fetus 
 More specifically, there is a huge difference between the probability of people 
perceiving card 1 as being a fetus (95%) and people perceiving card 2 as a fetus (17%), a 
difference of 78%. The corresponding gap is much smaller between cards 2 and 3 (a 
probability difference of only 17%). It means that, with respect to the attribute fetus, 
cards 1 and 2 share lower similarity between them than cards 2 and 3 (see Table 6). Card 
1 is perceived as highly similar to what a fetus is. Card 3 is not similar. People perceive a 
sharp distinction between cards 1 and 2. Because card 2 is very similar to card 3 with 
respect to the attribute fetus, i.e. they are both non-fetus, people perceive the boundary at 
the second card. We expect that, regarding the attribute “fetus”, people will cluster card 1 
against all the other cards because between cards 1 and 2 there is a bigger, sharper gap 
along the fetus/non-fetus continuum than between cards 2 and 3 or cards 3 and 4 or any 
two other cards. The fetus cluster would have only one item – card number 1 – and all the 
other cards would be in the non-fetus cluster. The choice of fetus as an attribute for 
clustering the items into subsets allows for a large information gain by reducing the 
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uncertainty regarding the categories. The large gap allows for a nice, crisp perceptual 
clustering through maximal distinctiveness.   
Comparison between cards with respect to fetus 
 
Cards 1 and 2 Cards 2 and 3 
Gap 0.78 0.17 
Within similarity High Low 
Between similarity Low High 
Table 6 – Fetus cards with respect to gap and relative similarity 
 The attribute fetus brings yet additional information gain due to the position of 
the gap. By describing card 1 as a fetus, the sender clusters his initial set of items into two 
subsets: the subset of fetus-like cards and the subset of non-fetus-like cards. Because the 
subset of fetus contains only 1 card (card 1) maximal information gain is achieved. 5 of 
the 6 items from the original set have been eliminated so there is no remaining 
uncertainty to be reduced.  
 In summation, the choice of the attribute “fetus” over “round” is the result of 
judgments of relative similarity. People perceive a sharp distinction between cards 1 and 
2 with respect to the attribute fetus. The attribute round does not allow for such a sharp 
distinction. In addition, the fetus subset has only 1 item – the target item; whereas the 
round subset will have either 3 or 4 items. Therefore by choosing fetus, both sender and 
receiver are better off. The sender knows how to refer to the target and the receiver 
knows which item is being referred to from the set of items. Maximal efficiency is 
achieved.    
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3.3.3 Hypotheses: Gap Size and Gap Position 
If people want to communicate an item from a set of ambiguous items, I postulate that 
there is a choice of an attribute that best distinguishes the target item. The sender 
perceives different ways to cluster the target based on how similar/dissimilar it is from 
the other items in the set with respect to different attributes.  The choice of the attribute 
that best distinguishes the target item comes from: 1. picking the attribute that results in 
the largest gap between clusters, and 2. picking the attribute that minimizes the sizes of 
the subset containing the target item, to reduce the set as efficiently as possible to a 
subset of 1 (the target). Based on this logic, the following hypotheses can be stated about 
how people choose between different attributes based on gap size and position. 
Hypothesis 1: when communicating an item from a set of items, if people have to 
choose between one or more attributes, they will choose the one which maximizes 
the size of the gap, if position of the gap is controlled for. 
 
Hypothesis 2: when communicating sets of items, if people have to choose between 
one or more attributes, they will choose the one which results in a smaller subset size 
compared to the entire set, if the size of the gap is controlled for.  
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3.4 Framework summary 
In summation, the aim of this study is to investigate how information is processed and 
uncertainty is reduced when people communicate about ambiguous, unstructured. I argue 
that the degree of structure of the stimuli influences the amount and the source of 
uncertainty to be handled. Low degree of structure increases uncertainty, and therefore 
increases the need for information. I assume the use of perceived relative similarity as a 
mechanism of structuring the communication process. By relative similarity I refer to the 
perceptual phenomenon whereby similarity is maximized within categories and 
minimized between categories with respect to one attribute.  
I argue that because relative similarity allows for clustering into subsets, it can 
be used to explain what happens when we communicate an item. During the 
communication process, if we want to refer to an item within a set of items we have to 
distinguish that item first. Distinguishing that item involves clustering. We cluster items 
that are similar to each other and leave out items that are dissimilar. Furthermore, I argue 
that judgments of relative similarity are made with respect to one attribute. Each time one 
attribute is perceived to create a cluster or a subset, uncertainty is reduced.  
Furthermore, I postulate that when people have to communicate unstructured 
stimuli with a choice of attribute from multiple possible attributes, two categorical logics 
operate to reduce uncertainty: one that maximizes distinctiveness between categories by 
allowing for a larger gap (hypothesis 1) and one that maximizes the information gain by 
allowing the initial set to be clustered into smaller subsets (hypothesis 2). In terms of 
results, for the gap size, I expect people to choose the attribute corresponding with the 
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larger perceived gap between two categories, resulting in a sharper distinction. For the 
gap position, I expect people to choose the attribute that would split the set into the 
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Chapter 4 
 Method  
4.1 Overview of the experiments  
Three experiments were designed to test the hypotheses. In all experiments, participants 
were presented a set of pictures or items and a corresponding set of attributes. 
Participants then performed a number of ranking tasks designed to emulate either the 
sender or the receiver perspective in a one-way communication situation. The sender 
tasks involved ranking a set of attributes based on the extent to which each attribute could 
be used to identify a specific target item from the set of items. The receiver tasks 
involved ranking a set of items given a single attribute based on the extent to which the 
attribute referred to the various items in the set.  
In the first two experiments I used ambiguous stimuli in which there were no 
obvious gaps creating distinctions. Experiment 1 used random drawings and experiment 2 
used Rorschach inkblots. The third experiment used a carefully designed two-
dimensional stimulus in which the attributes shape and colour were varied in a controlled 
manner. This allowed for manipulation of the position and size of the gap with respect to 
the two attributes. 
Three different one-way communication tasks were designed for the experiments. 
Experiments 1 and 2 each included all three tasks, while experiment 3 contained 2 of the 
tasks. All of the tasks involved participants ranking a presented set of items and 
attributes. For tasks 1 and 3, participants had to rank the attributes with respect to a target 
item. For task 2, they ranked items with respect to one specific attribute. The tasks were 
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designed to reflect the sender’s or receiver’s point of view. Tasks 1 and 3 adopted the 
sender’s point of view and task 2 the receiver’s. In the sender’s case, two methods of 
ranking were used – binary choice and direct ranking. Table 7 summarizes the three 
experiments and their respective tasks. 
 
Table 7 – Experiments and tasks 
The two hypotheses described in the previous section deal with a communication 
situation in which a person is describing an item from a set of items so that another 
person can identify it. All three experiments operationalize the hypotheses in the same 
basic way. Given different dimensions or attributes that can be used to describe a set of 
items, when people use them to refer to an item they effectively cluster the stimulus items 
into subsets, one subset including the target item and another subset not including the 
target item.  
The three tasks allow me to investigate the hypotheses as follows. Tasks 1 and 3 
provided attributes to participants to describe a target item from a set of items to another 
person. Task 2 provided an attribute to participants to rank the set of items according to 
how another person had described the items. Hypothesis 1 deals with the extent to which 
attributes are selected based on the gaps created between the two subsets. According to 
the first hypothesis, given two attributes, one which allowed for a larger gap between two 
different categories, and another for a smaller gap, I expected people to choose the 
attribute with the larger gap. Hypothesis 2 deals with the extent to which attributes are 
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selected based on the size of the subsets created. According to hypothesis two, if two 
attributes allow for grouping of subsets, I expected people to choose the attribute with the 
smallest subset containing the target item.  
Each of the experiments and its respective stimulus and tasks are explained in 
detail in the following sections.  
4.2 Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 used an unstructured stimulus. By degree of structure I refer to the extent to 
which participants are likely to perceive a sharp gap with respect to an attribute allowing 
for a clear distinction of an item. The stimulus consisted of a set of six cards with random 
drawings on them (see Table 8). Participants performed a series of three tasks in which 
they were given sets of items and descriptions or attributes. In the next sections I describe 
the experimental stimulus, followed by descriptions of each of the tasks in detail.  
4.2.1 Stimulus 
As described in the literature review, during my Masters’ I designed an experiment in 
which participants communicated about a set of 6 cards showing randomly drawn lines 
which I am also using as stimulus for this study. Data collected from that experiment 
allowed for the preparation of a list of attributes to be used in this study. Participants in 
the earlier experiment used many different descriptions to refer to the various cards. Out 
of these, I selected a set of 25 descriptions (9 per card) to use as attributes for describing 
the cards in the current study.  














looks like a 
bullet 
looks like a 
function 
looks like an 
“at” sign 
looks like a 
fetus 
has 2 and ½ 
fingers 
looks like a 
heart 
it’s an “A” if 
vertically 
oriented  
lines start in 
opposite 
corners 
looks like a 
tornado 
tips very close 
to each other 
has an “M” looks like a 
cartoon 
character 
ends with a 
straight line 
and a little 
hook 
looks like a 
cactus  
looks like an 
“e” 
looks like a 
broken phone 
it’s a monster 
going around 
its tail 
looks like a 
turtle 
Overlapping Attributes 
looks like a 
spiral 
has a finger looks like a 
spiral 
it’s a wrench it’s a wrench looks like a 
hand 
it’s a wrench looks like a 
snake 
looks like a 
snake 
looks like a 
spiral 
looks like a 
spiral 
looks like a 
shoe 
looks like a 
dinosaur 
looks like a 
shoe 
looks like a 
hand 
looks like a 
dinosaur 
looks like a 
dinosaur 
looks like a 
dinosaur 
Non-attributes 
has an “M” looks like an 
“at” sign 
looks like a 
cactus  
ends with a 
straight line 
and a little 
hook 
looks like a 
heart 
has 2 and ½ 
fingers 
looks like a 
function 
looks like a 
turtle 
it’s an “A” if 
vertically 
oriented 
it’s a monster 
going around 
its tail 
looks like an 
“e” 




close to each 
other 
looks like a 
broken phone 
looks like a 
fetus 
looks like a 
cartoon 
character 
looks like a 
tornado 
looks like a 
bullet 
Table 8 – List of pictures and attributes used in experiment 1 
To select the attributes I chose the ones used most frequently by participants in 
the previous experiment. I also attempted to select attributes that would create variability 
in the extent to which the description would uniquely distinguish each of the 6 cards. 
Specifically, for each card I chose 3 descriptions that were used only for that card in the 
previous experiment (unique attributes), 3 that were used to describe sets of 2 or more 
cards (overlapping attributes), and 3 that had been used to designate 1 or more of the 
other cards from the set (non-attributes). The resulting set of attributes and cards used as 
stimulus for this experiment is shown in Table 8.  
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4.2.2 Method  
Participants. 41 undergraduate students from a MSCI 311 class of the Management 
Science Department of the University of Waterloo participated in the study in exchange 
for a partial course credit.  
Materials. A Microsoft protected file with 3 different tasks. As stimuli, the tasks had 6 
cards with random drawings on them and some descriptions previously used to describe 
the cards. Table 8 shows the cards and their respective descriptions.  
Procedure. Participants received an interactive Microsoft Word fillable survey form by e-
mail. They were instructed to answer the survey and return the form via an Online 
dropbox. 46 students volunteered to participate in the study; 46 forms were sent out and 
41 filled forms were returned. Each interactive form consisted of 12 pages including a 
cover page with the invitation to participate and general instructions, 10 pages with a set 
of five experimental tasks and specific instructions, and a final page with some words of 
gratitude for their participation (see Appendix A). 18 different versions of forms were 
developed. Each group of participants received a file with a different version. Participants 
performed 3 different tasks in this experiment. To control for the potential order effects 
the forms randomized the order of the tasks, the order of descriptions, and the order of the 
6 card items within the set. To control for potential learning effects from one task to 
another and avoid common method bias the experiment was a between-subject design 
and none of the participants performed more than one task involving the same 
combination of target and descriptions. For example, if participants ranked descriptions 
for cards A and B in task 1, they would perform tasks 2 and 3 on a different set of cards. 
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Table 9 shows the different versions of the survey forms and the number of participants 
who completed each version.  
 
Table 9 – Experiment 1 design 
 
Task 1. Participants were presented a set of 6 cards with a selected target item, as well as 
a set of 36 pairs of descriptions from the set of attributes shown in Table 8. They were 
asked to select the description that best described the target item. There were in total 36 
pairs of descriptions for each target card. Those descriptions were composed of 9 
different attributes4: 3 unique, 3 overlapping and 3 non-attributes. All participants 
performed this task twice using a different target item and different pairs of descriptions. 
The following is an example of one version of task 1.  
                                                      
4 The 36 descriptions are a combination of all the 9 types of attributes among them, i.e. unique-unique, 
unique-overlapping, overlapping-non-feature, non-feature-non-feature.   
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Imagine you were trying to get another person to select the card indicated below from the set of 




The following 36 pairs of expressions could be used to describe the circled card. For each pair 
please choose the expression that you think would work best to get the person to select the right 
card. 
 
1.  has a finger  looks like a turtle 
2.  looks like a snake  looks like a broken phone 
3.  looks like a cactus   looks like an “at” sign 
4.  has a finger  looks like an “at” sign 
5.  looks like a snake  looks like a turtle 
6.  lines start in opposite corners  looks like a shoe 
7.  looks like a function  has a finger 
8.  looks like a cactus   has a finger 
9.  looks like a snake  looks like an “at” sign 
10.  lines start in opposite corners  looks like a snake 
11.  looks like a turtle  looks like a broken phone 
12.  looks like an “at” sign  looks like a turtle 
13.  looks like a function  looks like a cactus  
14.  has a finger  looks like a shoe 
15.  looks like a function  lines start in opposite corners 
16.  looks like a function  looks like a snake 
17.  lines start in opposite corners  has a finger 
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19.  looks like a shoe  looks like a turtle 
20.  looks like a cactus   looks like a broken phone 
21.  looks like a cactus   looks like a shoe 
22.  looks like a function  looks like a shoe 
23.  looks like a cactus   looks like a turtle 
24.  looks like a function  looks like a broken phone 
25.  looks like a shoe  looks like an “at” sign 
26.  lines start in opposite corners  looks like an “at” sign 
27.  looks like a cactus   looks like a snake 
28.  looks like a function  looks like an “at” sign 
29.  looks like an “at” sign  looks like a broken phone 
30.  has a finger  looks like a snake 
31.  lines start in opposite corners  looks like a broken phone 
32.  lines start in opposite corners  looks like a turtle 
33.  looks like a function  looks like a turtle 
34.  looks like a shoe  looks like a broken phone 
35.  looks like a snake  looks like a shoe 
36.  lines start in opposite corners  looks like a cactus  
 
Task 2. Participants were given the same set of 6 cards and one of the 25 descriptions as 
shown in Table 8. Their goal was to correctly select a card by ranking the set of cards 
from 1 (most likely answer) to 6 (least likely answer) based on the given description. 
Following is one version of task 2. 
Imagine you are communicating to a person in another room who has the following set of 6 cards. 
Your goal in this task is to correctly select cards based on descriptions provided by the other 
person. You will perform this task 9 times (for 9 different expressions). 
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Expression 1: The person describes one of these 6 items as looks like a cartoon character. 
Please rank the items from 1 to 6 in terms of which card the person is most likely referring to. (1 







1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
 
All 25 different descriptions shown in the list of attributes were used as 
descriptions for the set of cards. Those 25 descriptions were assigned to 3 different 
groups of participants. Therefore, participants were either given 8 or 9 different 
descriptions with which to rank their cards.  
Task 3. Participants received the set of 6 cards with a selected target item and 9 
descriptions from the list of attributes (Table 8). Their goal was to rank the given 
	 Card	1 Card	2 Card	3 
Card	6 Card	5 Card	4 
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descriptions from 1 to 9 in terms of which would most likely result in another person 
choosing the selected card. Each participant performed this task twice using a different 
target item and a different set of 9 descriptions.  
The following is an example of this task.  
Imagine you are communicating to a person in another room who has the following set of 6 cards. 




Please rank the following expressions from 1 to 9 in terms of which would most likely 














looks like a fetus       
looks like an “e”       
looks like a tornado       
looks like a hand       
looks like a spiral       
looks like a snake       
looks like a cactus        
it’s an “A” if vertically oriented       
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Measures. All three tasks used ranking as an indicator of participants’ perceived 
similarity of a given item with respect to a given attribute/description. In tasks 1 and 3, 
participants ranked descriptions with respect to cards. Task 1 descriptions were ranked 
based on the binary choice of 36 pairs of descriptions for the target cards. Task 3 was 
based on the direct ranking of 9 descriptions with respect to the target cards. In task 2, 
participants ranked the 6 cards with respect to each specific description. Analysis of 
correlation coefficients were used to test whether or not task 2 relative ranks could be 
predicted by task 1 ranks and also separately by task 3 ranks. In other words, correlations 
methods were used to test the extent to which participants’ perceptions of how to describe 
the items predicted which items were being identified by the given descriptions.  
In both of these correlations, i.e. the correlation between tasks 1 and 2 and the 
correlation between tasks 3 and 2, I analyzed the entire data at once instead of focusing 
on the size or position of gaps associated with specific attribute-item pairs. This is 
because gap size and position were not directly controlled in the design of the 
experimental stimulus. The use of the pictures and descriptions from a previous 
experiment meant that gap sizes and positions were considered random variables in this 
experiment. Different rankings of attributes for a card reflect the variability of the 
perceived gap positions and gap sizes on the part of sender and receiver. Correlation 
coefficients capture the degree to which differences in sender similarity judgments 
influences receiver ability to identify items based on given attribute descriptions.  
The data collected through experiment 1 is exclusively rank-based. Rankings 
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show what items the participants perceived as most likely to be described by a given 
description and which descriptions were most descriptive of a given item. Section 1.1. of 
the framework defined and exemplified the gap in terms of probabilities. In this 
experiment, the relative probabilities are embedded in the ranks. Given a certain 
distribution of ranked descriptions with respect to a card, one can determine how likely 
the participants are to select that card based on the descriptions. With these correlation 
coefficients it is possible to examine whether the information conveyed by the sender, in 
terms of which attributes best describe a given item, is related to the receiver’s 
interpretation in terms of which item is identified by given attributes.   
In addition to the correlations, a regression analysis was used to compute the 
differences between the attributes rank of each card of task 1 and the cards rank of each 
attribute of task 2. They show how much the difference in ranking on task 1 affects the 
difference in ranking on task 2. The same analysis was repeated between the attributes 
rank of cards of task 3 and the cards ranks of task 2.  
4.2.3 Results  
As mentioned above, the data collected from the three tasks were all ranks. Task 1 was a 
series of binary choices between pairs of attributes as to which of each pair would best 
described the target item. Task 2 was a direct ranking of the 6 items with respect to a 
specific attribute. Task 3 was similar to task 1, but involved a direct ranking, where a set 
of 9 attributes was ranked with respect to a target item. The binary choice data from task 
1 was converted into direct ranks by summing the number of times participants chose 
each of the 9 attributes for a given target item.  
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To examine whether or not task 2 relative ranks could be predicted by task 1 
ranks, the following steps were taken. A matrix with all the 25 attributes and the 
attributes rank for the 6 cards was created for task 1 (see Table 10 columns 1 and 2 as 
example of the matrix for card A). A similar matrix was created for task 2 (see Table 10 
column 3, showing the rank of card A for each attribute).  
To determine whether the task 2 ranks could predict task 3, the same type of 
correlations between tasks 3 and 2 were also investigated. Therefore, the procedure 
described above was also used for task 3 (see Table 10 columns 1 and 3 for an example 
of card A).  
	 
Table 10 – Example of data used in correlations between task1/3 attribute ranks and task 2 
card ranks for card A 
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Before testing the correlations, a chi-square of goodness of fit was used to 
examine whether or not task 2 relative ranks could be predicted by task 1 ranks. Given 25 
attributes and 6 cards, the combinations of ranking tasks were such that each attribute 
was ranked for a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 4 cards. The average ranking shows 
whether the attribute was ranked higher or lower for each card. Thus allowing the 
prediction of how well a attribute can describe a given card. This relative prediction is 
then compared with actual scores from task 2, where all 6 cards were ranked against 
those attributes.  If a task 2 ranking was consistent with the prediction, it was coded as 
“Yes”. If inconsistent with the prediction, the ranking was coded as “No”. Chi-square 
was then used to compare the prediction-coding relationship against a null-hypothesis of 
random chance. The result was significant, +, (1, N = 25) =16.43, p < 0.001. Task 1 
ranking could be used to predict the relative rank in task 2. The same test was applied to 
examine the relationship between task 3 and task 2. Again the result was significant	+, 
(1, N = 25) = 19.14, p < 0.001.  
To have a more precise analysis, Pearson correlations’ were performed to 
examine the extent to which participants’ perception of how to describe the items 
correlated with which items are best identified by the given description. Strongly positive 
correlations among attribute ranks in task 1 and card ranks in task 2 were found for all 6 
cards. Correlations were significant for cards A, B, C, D, and F at the 0.05 level but not 
significant for card E. Table 11 shows these results.  
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Correlations between task 1 ranks and task 2 ranks 
Cards df R p (2-tailed) 
A 7 0.74 0.024 
B 7 0.86 0.003 
C 7 0.84 0.005 
D 7 0.88 0.002 
E 7 0.52 0.147 
F 7 0.73 0.026 
Table 11 – Correlations between task 1 attribute ranks and task 2 card ranks 
Similar correlations were tested between task 3 attribute ranks and task 2 card 
ranks. As shown in table 12, strong positive correlations were found for all 6 cards. The 
correlations were significant at the 0.05 level for cards B, C, D, and F, and at the level of 
0.1 for card A.  
Correlations between task 3 ranks and task 2 ranks 
Cards df R p (2-tailed) 
A 7 0.61 0.080 
B 7 0.78 0.014 
C 7 0.84 0.005 
D 7 0.69 0.040 
E 7 0.54 0.134 
F 7 0.68 0.044 
Table 12 – Correlations between task 3 attribute ranks and task 2 card ranks 
It is not a surprise that both analyses (between tasks 1 and 2, and between tasks 3 
and 2) show consistent correlations as the attribute rankings of task 1 and the attribute 
rankings of task 3 were also highly correlated (see Table 13). For both tasks, participants 
ranked the same attributes as the best descriptor of specific cards. This shows that the two 
  78 
methods for ranking cards – binary choices and direct ranking – are both reliable 
methods. Either is an appropriate method for detecting differences in items with respect 
to a given attribute. Ranking therefore can be used as a measure of the relative 
information conveyed by a given attribute to distinguish items. The high correlations 
between the attribute rankings of tasks 1 and 3 also suggest that the attributes were quite 
salient to participants.	
	
Correlations between task 1 ranks and task 3 
ranks	
Cards	 df	 R	 p (2-tailed)	
A	 7	 0.92	 0.001	
B	 7	 0.83	 0.005	
C	 7	 1.00	 0.001	
D	 7	 0.83	 < 0.001	
E	 7	 0.83	 0.005	
F	 7	 0.85	 0.004	
Table 13 – Correlations between task 1 attribute ranks and task 3 attribute ranks 
Following, I tested how much the difference ranking on task 1 affects the 
difference ranking on task 2. Again a matrix with the 27 attributes and the 6 cards was 
created for tasks 1 and 2 (Table 14 columns 1 and 2 is an example for card A). Scores 
from the raw data were used for this measurement. For Task 1, the score was calculated 
as the sum of how many times participants chose a specific attribute divided by the sum 
of all the attributes chosen for the same card. For example, for card A, participants chose 
the attribute in binary choice selection “it is an ‘A’ vertically oriented” 87 times. 
Participants made a total of 448 binary choices selections of descriptions in total for card 
A. Hence, 87 divided by 448 equals 0.194 (as observed in row 2, column 2 in Table 14). 
For Task 2, each participant ranked 9 descriptions with respect to the set of 6 cards. I 
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used the average among the total of participants ranks as the score (see Table 14 column 
4).  
A simple linear regression was calculated to predict the difference in ranking on 
task 2 based on difference in ranking on task 1. A significant regression equation was 
found F(1, 52) = 81.965, p < 0.001, with an R2 of 0.612, standardized β= -0.782. In other 
words, one unit decrease in the task 1 scores corresponds to a 0.782 increase in rank in 
task 2. The standardized beta coefficient is negative because when task 1 attributes for 
each of the cards were transformed into a score they became inversely proportional to 
task 2 average means. In other words, while task 1 attributes with the highest scores were 
the best descriptors for a specific card, in task 2 an attribute best description had the 
smallest numerical rank. 
Task 3 and task 2 were also tested in the same way. For task 3, I used average 
attributes rank (see Table 14 column 3 as example for card A). A simple linear regression 
was calculated to predict the difference in ranking on task 2 based on difference in 
ranking on task 3. A significant regression equation was found F(1, 52) = 75.203, p < 
0.001, with an R2 of 0.591, standardized β= 0.769. In other words, for each unit of 
difference in ranking in task 3 here are 0.769 units of difference in ranking in task 2.   
Those differences are an indication of participants’ perception of how much a 
given attribute better describes one card over other cards. High correlations in these 
differences suggest that participants perceived certain attributes as being better 
descriptors than others. This difference shows that participants did indeed perceive 
certain attributes as showing greater distinctiveness of a target card, thus allowing for a 
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Table 14 – Example of computed scores used in regression analyses between tasks 1/3 
attribute ranks and task 2 cards ranks for card A 
4.2.4 Discussion  
Hypothesis 1 states that during the communication process if people have a choice among 
multiple attributes to communicate an item they will choose the attribute that maximizes 
the size of gap. Hypothesis 2 says that a person will choose the attribute that decreases 
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the size of the subset the most, resulting in the smaller subset as possible regarding gap 
position.  
Unfortunately the design of experiment 1 was not able to directly measure the 
effects of gap size and gap position. As described in the measures section, the data 
collected was rank-based. Ranking gives information about which attributes best 
distinguish one item from a set of items. The ranks provide an indicator of overall 
similarity judgments of attributes with respect to items and items with respect to 
attributes. However, they do not directly measure gap size or gap position. The two 
hypotheses were measured indirectly through determining correlations between each 
attributes rank in different tasks.  
Results from the first two analyses – between tasks 1 and 2 attribute rankings and 
between tasks 3 and 2 attribute rankings – show very high correlations. In task 2, 
participants adopted the view of the receiver of the message and in tasks 1 and 3 the 
adopted view was that of a sender. High correlation of the rankings indicates that the 
sender uncertainty, with respect to how to refer to an item, and the receiver uncertainty, 
of how to identify the item selected, were both reduced. Specifically, the information 
conveyed by the sender in terms of which attributes best described a given item 
influenced the interpretation of the receiver in terms of which items were identified by a 
given attribute.  
The results from the regression equations were also significant. The tests 
indicated to what degree participants perceived a given attribute to be similar to a target 
card. The evidence showed that participants perceived differences between attributes, i.e. 
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they perceived one attribute being more similar to a card than another attribute. Because 
participants perceived a difference, there was a higher likelihood of selecting the target 
card.  
Although hypotheses 1 and 2 were not directly tested, the results are consistent 
with what would be expected if the hypotheses were true. The evidence shows that 
attributes that are more distinctive from the point of view of the sender also end up being 
more selective from the point of view of the receiver, which is consistent with the 
argument of gap position and gap size, as hypothesized. Nonetheless it is theoretically 
possible to obtain similar correlation and regression results based on a general similarity-
based judgment process rather than the more specific gap size and position theory 
proposed here. .  
4.3 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 replicated experiment 1 using as stimulus the well-known Rorschach 
inkblots, which were originally developed by Hermann Rorschach in 1921 as a projection 
technique in clinical psychology (Exner, 2003). In psychotherapy the examiner presents 
the inkblots to a client whose task is to describe what they see on each inkblot. Exner 
(2003) has compiled evidence showing the descriptions that people commonly use to 
describe each of the pictures; from this I selected a set of pictures and descriptions to use 
in this experiment.  
From Rorschach’s original 10 inkblots, I selected 6 to use as stimuli (see Figure 
5), so as to be consistent with experiment 1 which also used 6 cards. The 6 pictures in 
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figure 5 were chosen because they were the 6 most described pictures from the Exner 
report. A large number of different descriptions was important to match the same 
variability among the descriptions as in experiment 1.   
 
Figure 5 – Experiment 2 stimulus 
4.3.1 Stimulus  
I followed a similar approach to that used in experiment 1 in selecting a set of 17 
attributes from the descriptions compiled by Exner (2003) (see Table 15). I selected some 
descriptions which were unique to a single picture, and some that were overlapping, in 
that people had used them to describe more than one picture. Descriptions that were 
unique for one of the figures were also paired up with other pictures as “non-attributes” 
to create a set of attributes for each picture that varied in the extent to which the 
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descriptions reported by Exner (2003) referred to small details of the pictures (e.g. hats, 
legs, etc), I decided to used only descriptions that referred to the whole picture or to a 
large portion of a picture. It was not possible to replicate experiment 1 with respect to the 
number of attributes per picture because Exner’s list did not include enough “unique” and 
“overlapping” descriptions to match the design precisely. Therefore instead of using 3 of 














looks like a 
garden  
looks like an 
eagle 
looks like elves looks like 
boots 
looks like a 
vampire 
looks like fire 
and smoke 
looks like a 
vase 
looks like a 
spinal 
vertebrae 
looks like a 
cloud 
looks like a 
coat hanged 
looks like a 
dancer in 
costume 
looks like bears 
Overlapping Attributes 
looks like a 
mask 
looks like a 
mask 
looks like two 
people 
looks like a 
butterfly 
looks like a 
butterfly 
looks like two 
people 
looks like an 
art/statue 
looks like a 
butterfly 






looks like an 
art/statue 
Non-attributes 
looks like a 
spiral vertebrae 
looks like bears looks like a 
coat hanged 
looks like elves looks like 
boots 
looks like an 
eagle 
looks like a 
cloud 
looks like vase looks like a 
vampire 
looks like a 
garden 
looks like fire 
and smoke 
looks like a 
dancer in 
costume 
Table 15 – List of pictures and attributes used in experiment 2 
 
4.3.2 Method  
Participants. 105 undergraduate students from a MSCI 211 class at the University of 
Waterloo participated in the study in exchange for partial course credit.  
Materials. Experiments 2 and 3 were performed simultaneously in a single survey. The 
material was similar to that used in experiment 1, a Microsoft protected file, however this 
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time each participant performed 5 different tasks. Experiments 2 and 3 were included on 
the same file. Experiment 2 had 3 tasks, similar to the tasks performed in experiment 1, 
while experiment 3 consisted of 2 tasks. I will explain experiment 3 in the following 
section. As stimuli for experiment 2, the tasks used the 6 Rorschach inkblots and their 
respective attributes as shown in table 15.  
Procedure. Similar to experiment 1, participants received an interactive Microsoft Word 
fillable form by e-mail. They were instructed to answer the survey and return the form via 
an Online dropbox. 249 forms were sent out to the MSCI 211 undergrad students and 107 
forms were returned. 1 of the files could not be opened, and another one was blank and 
therefore both were discarded, resulting in 105 completed forms. Each interactive form 
consisted of 30 pages containing one first page with the consent of participation and a 
second page with general instructions, 12 pages with a task from experiment 3, three 
tasks from experiment 2, an additional 12 pages with the second task from experiment 3, 
and one page with words of gratitude for their participation (see Appendix B). 
12 different versions of the survey form were designed. To control for order 
effects, forms varied with respect to the order of tasks, order of descriptions, and order of 
stimuli within the set of items. In addition, to control for learning effects the survey forms 
were designed in a way that participants did not perform any task with repeat target items 
from the stimulus or with repeated sets of descriptions. To avoid common method bias 
experiment 2 was a between-subject design. Experiment 3 was a within-subject design 
and will be discussed in section 4.5. Table 16 shows how the two experiments were 
designed and performed.  
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Table 16 – Experiment 2 design 
 
Task 1. Participants were presented with a set of 6 Rorschach pictures and 15 pairs of 
descriptions from the list of attributes (see Table 15). The descriptions were composed of 
6 different attributes5: 2 unique, 2 overlapping and 2 non-attributes. The aim was to rank 
the best description with respect to the selected target picture.  
                                                      
5 The 15 descriptions are a combination of all the 6 types of attributes among them, i.e. unique-unique, 
unique-overlapping, overlapping-non-feature, non-feature-non-feature.   
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The following is an example of this task.  
For this task, imagine you were trying to get another person to select the picture indicated from 
the set of pictures shown at the left.  
 
       
The following 15 pairs of descriptions could be used to describe the circled picture. For each 





1  looks like an eagle  looks like a mask 
2.  looks like a spinal vertebrae (disc)  looks like a vase 
3.  looks like a mask  looks like a vase 
4.  looks like a spinal vertebrae (disc)  looks like a mask 
5.  looks like an eagle  looks like bears 
6.  looks like a spinal vertebrae (disc)  looks like an eagle 
7.  looks like a spinal vertebrae (disc)  looks like bears 
8.  looks like an eagle  looks like a butterfly 
9.  looks like a butterfly  looks like a vase 
10.  looks like a butterfly  looks like bears 
















Task 2. Participants were given the set of 6 Rorschach pictures and one of the 17 
descriptions shown in the list of attributes (Table 15). Their task was to rank the pictures 
from 1 to 6 based on which was most likely being described by the given description. The 
following version is an example of task 2.  
 
Now, imagine you are communicating to a person in another room who has the set of 6 pictures 
shown at the left. Your goal is to select pictures based on descriptions provided by the other 
person. For each of the following descriptions please rank the items from 1 to 6 in terms of which 





12.  looks like an eagle  looks like a vase 
13.  looks like a mask  looks like bears 
14.  looks like a butterfly  looks like a mask 
15.  looks like a spinal vertebrae (disc)  looks like a butterfly 
The other person uses the description  






1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
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 All 17 descriptions shown in the list of attributes were used to rank the set of 
Rorschach pictures. Those 17 descriptions were assigned to 6 different groups of 
participants. Therefore, participants were either given 2 or 3 different descriptions with 
which to rank their pictures.  
Task 3. Participants received the set of 6 Rorschach pictures with a target card and 6 
descriptions from the list of attributes (Table 15). The goal of this task was to rank the 
given descriptions from 1 to 6 based on which would most likely get another person to 
select the targeted picture.  
Imagine you are communicating to a person in another room who has set of 6 pictures at the left. 
Your goal in this task is to get the other person to correctly select the picture indicated.  Please 
rank the following descriptions from 1 to 6 in terms of which would most likely get the person to 





Measures. As previously mentioned, experiment 2 was a replication of experiment 1 




looks like a cloud       
looks like art/statues       
looks like a coat hanged       
looks like two people       
looks like a vampire       
looks like elves       
  90 
Ranking was used in all three tasks. Task 1 was a binary choice of attributes and tasks 2 
and 3 used direct ranking. In task 1 and 3 participants ranked descriptions with respect to 
pictures and in task 2, they ranked pictures with respect to one description. These 
rankings were analyzed using correlation methods. The first correlation examined the 
extent to which participants’ perception of how to describe the items of the set correlated 
with which items are best identified by the given description. As in experiment 1, 
correlations between tasks 1 and 2 and between tasks 3 and 2 were examined. As 
mentioned in the experiment 1 measures section, in both of these tests I analyzed the two 
hypotheses at once. Ranking data gives information about how descriptive items are. 
Since both hypotheses predict that people will choose the attribute which maximizes 
information gain, correlation between those ranks is a good measure to test both 
hypotheses.   
A regression analysis was used to show how much the difference ranking on task 
1 affects the difference ranking on task 2. A similar effect between tasks 3 and 2 was also 
tested with a second regression analysis. Those additional tests indicated how much 
participants perceived a given attribute to be similar with respect to a target card. 
4.3.3 Results 
To examine whether or not task 1 attribute ranks could be predicted by task 2 pictures 
rank, the same steps were followed as in experiment 1. A matrix with all attributes and 
their rankings for the 6 pictures was created for task 1 (see Table 17 columns 1, 2 as 
example of the matrix for picture A). A similar matrix was created for task 2 (see Table 
17 columns 1 and 4, as example of the matrix for picture A). As it can be observed from 
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the table, only the column for task 2 attributes was complete. Task 1 and 3 attributes of 
experiment 2 were limited to the 6 attributes previously identified from Exner’s (2003) 
table of descriptions.  
The same type of relationship between tasks 3 and 2 was also investigated. That 
is, a correlation method was used to examine whether or not task 3 attribute ranks could 
be predicted by task 2 pictures ranks (see Table 17 columns 1 and 3 for an example of 
picture A).  
Table 17 – Example of data used in correlations between tasks 1/3 attribute ranks and task 
2 pictures ranks for picture A 
 
Before testing the correlations, a chi-square goodness of fit test was used to 
examine whether or not task 2 relative ranks could be predicted by task 1 ranks. Given 
that there were 17 attributes and 6 pictures, the combinations of ranking tasks were such 
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that each attribute was ranked for a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 3 pictures. The task 
1 and 3 rankings show whether the attribute is ranked higher or lower for a given picture, 
that is, how good an attribute is as a descriptor of a given picture. The rankings from 
tasks 1 and 3 were then compared with how the attributes scored on task 2, where all 6 
pictures were ranked against those attributes.  If the predicted and actual scores were 
consistent they were coded as “Yes” if they were not consistent they were coded as “No”. 
The result for tasks 1 and 2 was not significant, +, (1, N = 25) = 25.09, p = 0.157. 
According to the goodness of fit test, task 1 rank could not be used to predict the relative 
ranks of task 2. The same test was applied to examine the relationship between task 3 and 
task 2. The result was also not significant, +, (1, N = 25) = 29.56, p = 0.090.  
Next, I examined the extent to which participants’ perception of how to describe 
the items of the set correlated with which items are best identified by the given 
description. Task 1 attribute ranks for each picture were correlated to task 2 pictures 
ranks for each picture. The correlations coefficients were all strong (R > 0.3). 
Correlations were significant at 0.05 level for pictures B and D, but not for pictures A, C, 
D, F. Table 18 shows the results.  
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Correlations between task 1 ranks and task 2 ranks 
Pictures Df R p (2-tailed) 
A 4 0.68 0.140 
B 4 0.90 0.014 
C 4 0.31 0.546 
D 4 0.83 0.043 
E 4 0.59 0.215 
F 4 0.49 0.326 
Table 18 – Correlations between task 1 attribute ranks and task 2 picture ranks 
 
Similar correlations were tested between task 3 attribute ranks and task 2 pictures 
ranks. As shown in table 19, except for picture A, all results were also strongly 
correlated. Correlations were significant at 0.05 level for pictures D and F, at the level 
0.01 for card B, and not significant for cards A, C, E. 
Correlations between task 3 ranks and task 2 ranks 
Pictures Df R p (2-tailed) 
A 4 0.17 0.749 
B 4 0.77 0.075 
C 4 0.47 0.344 
D 4 0.83 0.043 
E 4 0.55 0.255 
F 4 0.81 0.049 
Table 19 – Correlation between task 3 attribute ranks and task 2 picture ranks 
Tasks 1 and 3 exemplified two different methods for ranking pictures with respect 
to descriptions. Table 20 summarizes the correlations between attribute ranks obtained in 
tasks 1 and 3. The results show strong positive correlations between task 1 rankings and 
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task 3 rankings. The high correlations suggest that the attributes were quite salient to 
participants. Thus the two methods for ranking pictures were both good methods for 
detecting differences in similarity between items with respect to a given attribute. 
Ranking therefore could be used as a measure of the relative information conveyed by a 
given attribute to distinguish items.  
Correlations between task 1 ranks and task 3 tasks 
Pictures df R p (2-tailed) 
A 4 0.43 0.397 
B 4 0.77 0.072 
C 4 0.93 0.008 
D 4 0.94 0.005 
E 4 0.88 0.020 
F 4 0.83 0.042 
Table 20 – Correlations between task 1 picture ranks and task 3 picture ranks 
I tested how much the difference ranking on tasks 1 and 3, respectively, affect the 
difference ranking on task 2 through regression analyses. A matrix with all the attributes 
and pictures used in the experiment was created for all three tasks (see Table 21 as an 
example for picture A). The same kind of scoring used in experiment 1 was used in 
experiment 2. For Task 1, I determined the sum of how many times participants used the 
same attribute divided by the sum of all attributes for the same picture (see table 21 
column 2 is an example for picture A). For tasks 2 and 3, average ranks across 
participants were used (see Table 21 columns 3 and 4).  
A simple linear regression was calculated to predict the difference in ranking for 
task 2 based on difference in ranking on task 1. A significant regression equation was 
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found: F(1,34) = 9.248, p = 0.005, R2 of 0.214, standardized β=-0.464. In other words, 
one unit decrease in the task 1 scores corresponds to a 0.464 increase in rank in task 2. 
The standardized beta coefficient is negative because when task 1 attributes for each of 
the pictures were transformed into a score they became inversely proportional to task 2 
average ranks.  
Task 3 and task 2 were tested in the same way. As with task 2, I used average 
attributes ranks for task 3 (see table 21 column 3 as example for picture A). A simple 
linear regression was calculated to predict the difference in ranking on task 2 based on 
difference in ranking on task 3. A significant regression equation was found: F(1,34) = 
7.510, p = 0.010, R2 of 0.181, standardized β= 0.425. In other words, for each unit of 
difference in ranking in task 3 there are 0.425 units of difference in ranking in task 2.  
These differences are an indication of participants’ perception of how much a 
given attribute better describes one picture than others. In other words, how sharp the gap 
is. High correlations suggest that certain descriptions allowed participants perception of a 
sharp gap, as predicted by my hypothesis. 
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Table 21 – Example of computed scores used in correlations between tasks 1/3 attribute 
ranks and task 2 picture ranks for picture A 
 
 
4.3.4 Discussion  
Experiment 2 was a replication of experiment 1. Therefore the results of the 
experiment were also consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 states that during 
the communication process if people have a choice among multiple attributes to 
communicate an item they will choose the attribute that maximizes the size of gap. 
Hypothesis 2 says that they will choose the attribute that decreases the size of the subset 
the most, resulting in the smaller subset as possible regarding the gap position.  
Because data collected for experiment 2 was rank-based, a direct measure for gap 
position and gap size was not developed. Ranking gives information about which 
attributes best distinguish one item from a set of items. The ranks provide an indicator of 
overall similarity judgments of attributes with respect to items and items with respect to 
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attributes. However, they do not directly measure gap size or gap position. The two 
hypotheses were measured indirectly through correlations between attributes ranks from 
different tasks.  
Although results for the first set of correlations – correlation between tasks 1 
attribute ranks and tasks 2 pictures ranks and correlation between task 3 attribute ranks 
and task 2 pictures ranks – were not as high as in experiment 1, they were still 
considerably high. In part, the differences in the correlation results can be explained due 
to having a smaller number of attributes. For instance, in experiment 1 there were 9 data 
points being correlated while in experiment 2 there were only 6 data points. The smaller 
number of data points being correlated makes the test very strict. Despite those 
differences the results were consistent across the two experiments. 
Tasks 1 and 3 reflect the sender’s view and task 2 reflects the receiver’s view. 
Strong correlations between sender and receiver ranks is an indication that the sender’s 
uncertainty with respect to how to refer to an item and the receiver’s uncertainty of which 
item an attribute refers to were both reduced. More specifically, the information 
conveyed by the sender in terms of which attributes best described a given item 
influenced the interpretation of the receiver in terms of which items were identified by a 
given attribute.  
The results for the regression equations were also quite strong. Those additional 
tests indicated how much participants perceived a given attribute to be similar to a target 
picture. Those results were evidence that participants perceived differences between 
attributes, i.e. they perceived one attribute being more similar to a picture than another 
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attribute. Because they perceived that difference, their chance of selecting the right 
picture was increased.  
Since experiment 2 was a replication of experiment 1, hypotheses 1 and 2 were 
not tested directly either. Still the same conclusions are valid. Taken together, the results 
provide evidence that attributes that are more descriptive from the point of view of the 
sender also end up being more selective from the point of view of the receiver, which is 
consistent with the argument of gap position and gap size in the hypotheses. Nonetheless 
it is theoretically possible to obtain similar correlation and regression results based on a 
general similarity-based judgment process rather than the more specific gap size and 
position theory proposed here.  
4.4 Experiments 1 and 2: General Discussion  
Results from experiments 1 and 2 gave evidence consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Similarity judgments of the items were measured in terms of ranking attributes with 
respect to pictures (task 1 and 3) and in terms of ranking items with respect to the 
attributes (task 2). Tasks 1 and 3 give participants the point of view of the sender, and in 
doing so, predict the receivers view. Similarity judgments of the items by the sender, as 
measured in terms of ranking given attributes, allow prediction of a receivers’ point of 
view. The senders’ perceptions of similarity of the item were strongly correlated with that 
of the receivers’ perceptions. The strong correlation gives evidence that participants had a 
preference for certain attributes over other attributes.    
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Perception of differences between items with respect to a given attribute was also 
strongly correlated with differences in the likelihood of participants selecting a target 
item given an attribute. Taken together those results provide evidence supporting the 
hypotheses; attributes that are more diagnostic from the point of view of the sender also 
end up being more selective from the point of view of the receiver, which is consistent 
with the argument of gap position and gap size in the hypotheses.  
Although the correlations and regressions results were consistent with what would 
be expected if the hypotheses were true, they were not a direct test of the hypotheses. As 
stated previously it is possible to imagine a situation where similar results could be 
obtained based on a more general similarity judgment process rather the specific gap size 
and position theory proposed here. For example, if one considers the probability 
distribution tables (Table 3 and Table 5) presented earlier in the framework section, one 
could imagine a distribution in which item probabilities differed from one another by 
equal discrete amounts. In such a case, there would be no sharp gap separating any 
possible subsets of the items despite consistent similarity judgments across participants. 
Thus it is possible that people use general similarity judgments of items relative to 
attributes (and attributes relative to items) to process information in communication 
without necessarily using perceived gaps.   
Experiments 1 and 2 were designed with some characteristics that allowed certain 
achievements while also causing certain limitations. For example, both experiments were 
designed with ambiguous or unstructured stimuli. Unstructured stimuli are 
multidimensional. In theory, given a multidimensional stimulus, people can perceive an 
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infinite variety of attributes that they can use to cluster items and create distinctions. In 
other words, there are no limits in how people differentiate dimensions to cluster items. 
Therefore, in order to use the random drawings and the Rorschach inkblots as stimuli, I 
had to create a finite set of dimensions or attributes.  
The list of attributes was created based on descriptions used by real people to 
describe the same items in previous circumstances. This was both an advantage and a 
limitation. It was an advantage because the data was not fictitious. However, it was also a 
limitation because I did not have the same data collected for all three tasks. In both 
experiments 1 and 2, task 2 was the only one in which participants ranked all the items 
with respect to all the attributes. In tasks 1 and 3 participants ranked certain attributes 
with respect to certain items. In other words, not all attributes were used to describe all 
the items. Certain attributes were used uniquely to describe a specific item, while other 
attributes were used for two or three items.  
Another potential disadvantage of using naturalistic descriptions is that they vary 
in complexity. For example, some of the descriptions referred to one object and some 
referred to more complex images (e.g. “wrench” vs. “it’s a monster going around its tail”, 
in experiment 1). More complex descriptions raise the question of how many attributes 
were actually associated with a given description. For instance does the participant 
perceive a monster going around its tail as a single holistic image or as do they process it 
as a sequence of attributes, e.g. “monster”, “tail”, “going around”, etc.?  
In addition, the degree of similarity varied depending on which attribute they 
identified. An attribute could result in a very sharp distinction, thereby reducing 
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uncertainty with respect to how to refer to an item and by reducing the size of the subset 
at the same time. Another attribute could result in a less sharp distinction since there was 
no perception of a sharp gap but uncertainty was reduced due to the position of the gap 
by decreasing the size of the subset.  
Finally, unstructured stimuli did not allow for control in terms of the gap size and 
gap position. In multidimensional stimuli, there is random variation in the size and 
position of the gap for any of the dimensions.  
4.5 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to address some of the limitations of experiments 1 and 2. 
The experiment was designed with a two-dimensional stimulus as shown in Figure 6. The 
use of two dimensions limited what participants were paying attention to, and allowed for 
manipulation of the similarity of the items in different ways along the two dimensions.  
The two dimensions used in experiment 3 were shape and colour. Shape varied 
from triangle to circle and colour varied from red to yellow. Thus each of the items in 
figure 6 could be described by any of the four attributes “red”, “yellow”, “triangle”, and 
“circle”. Moreover, the shapes and colours varied in a 5x5 grid6 (see figure 6). Due to 
their relative positions in the grid, different items varied in degree of similarity with 
respect to the two dimensions by fixed and discrete amounts.  
The two-dimensional grid allowed for direct control of the gap size and gap 
position by using different stimulus designs consisting of different sets of items selected 
                                                      
6 The 5x5 grid was drawn by Kristen Duimering. 
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from the 25 items in figure 6. Moreover, since the variables were discrete, they allowed 
for a different type of measure. Pairwise comparisons rather than correlations are 
appropriate to handle discrete variables. I am directly comparing one stimulus design 
with a given gap size with another stimulus design with another gap size, for instance. 
 
Figure 6 – Experiment 3 stimulus 
 
As mentioned in section 2, experiments 2 and 3 were performed simultaneously 
as part of the same survey with the same participants. Participants performed two tasks in 
experiment 3, each consisting of the four attributes (red, yellow, triangle, and circle) and 
a set of items selected from the 25 grid positions in figure 6. In task 1, the participants use 
binary choices to select the best attribute to describe a target item with respect to the set 
of items. In task 2, the participants ranked the items with respect to each of the four 
attributes. Therefore, experiment 3 addressed the issue of incomplete data mentioned in 






42 43 44 45 
51 52 53 54 55 
33 34 35 
22 23 24 25 
11 12 13 14 15 
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All of those aspects of experiment 3 design will be explained in detail in the next 
sections.  
4.5.1 Stimulus design 
In the 5x5 grid, shape varied from triangle to circle on the horizontal axis, and colour 
varied from yellow to red on the vertical axis. For each set of items used in experiment 3, 
the target was always the item in the middle of the grid (item 33), which theoretically 
could be identified equally well using any of the four attributes, triangle, circle, red, or 
yellow.  
The main goal of a structured design, in which items would have a fixed position, 
was to control for the two categorical logics and better test the two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 referred to the gap size. It states that when people communicate 
unstructured stimuli, and can choose among multiple attributes to describe items, they 
will choose the one which maximizes the gap size between the category containing the 
target item and the category containing the remaining items. Reflecting the gap position, 
hypothesis 2 says that when people have to communicate unstructured stimuli and they 
have a choice among alternative attributes, they will chose the one which will maximize 
information gain, by minimizing the size of the category containing the target item. 
For the design of the stimulus sets, in each case I selected a set of 4 to 6 items 
from the grid, including the target item (33). The sets were presented to participants in 
randomly ordered arrangements to avoid conveying to them the idea that the items were 
selected from an organized grid. Depending on the chosen set of items it is possible to 
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create several stimulus conditions such that the target is more or less similar to the other 
items in the set and the gap size and position can be varied in a controlled manner.  
The example shown in Figure 7A was one of four “baseline” stimulus designs that 
were used as the control conditions for the experiment. It consisted of the five items 42, 
43, 33, 34, and 24. The item in the middle is the target (item 33). Items 42 and 43 are 1 
distance unit away from the target in the colour dimension (i.e., 1 unit more red) and 
items 34 and 24 are 1 distance unit away from the target in the shape dimension (i.e., 1 
unit more circular). Several other stimulus designs were created from the baseline design 
by replacing one or more of items 42, 43, 34, and 24 with other items from the 5x5 grid, 
to manipulate gap size, gap position, or both gap size and position simultaneously with 
respect to the shape and colour dimensions. 
The assumption in the design is that the perceived similarity between items should 
correlate closely with distance between items in the 5x5 grid. For example, an item 1 unit 
away from the target (e.g. items 32 or 23) should be perceived as more similar to the 
target than an item that is 2 units away (e.g. items 13 or 31). Although I take the grid 
distance between two items as an indicator of their similarity, it is evident that people are 
likely to perceive the similarity of items in ways that do not correspond directly to grid 
distances. It is important to note, however, that I only consider relative differences in 
similarity from one stimulus condition to another, not the absolute similarity of items for 
any single stimulus. In the baseline stimulus design, for instance, if human similarity 
perceptions were identical to grid distances, I would expect participants to describe the 
target as either a triangle or yellow with equal frequency (because the target item is equal 
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distance from pure triangle and pure yellow). However, if perceptual judgments of 
similarity differed from grid distances, for example such that people described the target 
as a triangle 60% of the time and as yellow only 40% of the time, then any changes in 
gap size or position should vary from this 60:40 base rate in the direction predicted by the 
hypotheses. Thus, although similarity perceptions do not correspond directly to grid 
distances, it seems reasonable to assume that the relative degree of perceived similarity 
should be correlated with relative distances within the grid. 
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In the next sections I explain how gap size and gap position were varied in 
different stimulus conditions. Since they all varied in several different ways, I will 
explain one example of each. All the examples given are based on the binary choice of 
describing the target item (33) as either a triangle or as yellow. Because all stimulus 













43 42 41 
A – Baseline stimulus design B – Change in Gap Size 
C – Change in Gap Position  D – Change in Gap Size and Position  
Baseline stimulus design 1a01  
Stimulus design 1a09 
Stimulus design 1a04 
Stimulus design 1a05 
Figure 7 – Example of baseline stimulus design and different manipulations 
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A. Baseline stimulus design 
As noted above, Figure 7A (stimulus design 1a01)7 shows a baseline stimulus design 
consisting of the target item 33 along with items 42, 43, 34, and 24. The black lines are 
used to represent how participants were expected to structure the stimulus into two 
subsets, or clusters, by describing the target item (33) as either a triangle or as yellow. 
For instance, by describing item 33 as a triangle, participants group 33 together with 
items 42 and 43 (other triangles), while 34 and 24 become “non-triangles”. By describing 
item 33 as yellow, participants group 33 together with items 34 and 24 (other yellow 
items), while items 42 and 43 become  “non-yellow”. Because the subset sizes of triangle 
and yellow are the same in this case (3 items each) the position of the gap is equal for 
both dimensions. Similarly, the distance in the grid between item 33 and items 34 and 24 
(i.e., between triangles and non-triangles) is the same as the distance between item 33 and 
items 42 and 43 (i.e., between yellow and non-yellow items), the gap size is also equal 
for both dimensions (1 unit distance each). 
B. Gap size 
The gap size was increased by shifting items away from the target in the direction of the 
colour or in the direction of the shape. Figure 7B is an example of a stimulus design in 
which gap size varied (stimulus design 1a04). In this case there is a gap of 2 units in the 
shape dimension (between triangles and non-triangles) and 1 unit in the colour dimension 
(between yellow and non-yellow items), as indicated by the black vertical and horizontal 
lines respectively. The larger gap for the shape dimension suggests that a sharper 
                                                      
7 A coding scheme was used to refer to the various stimulus designs. The scheme will be explained later in 
section 4.5.2 
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distinction can be drawn, and more uncertainty reduced, by describing the target item 
(33) as a triangle than as yellow. As a result, compared to the baseline stimulus design, I 
expected that people would shift their choices toward triangle, the attribute with the 
larger gap.  
In addition to the example in figure 7B the two stimulus designs in Figure 8 were 
also included as examples of changes in gap size relative to the baseline design.  
 
Figure 8 – Gap size changes 
C. Gap position  
Gap position refers to the relative size of the subsets associated with describing the target 
with respect to a particular attribute. The gap position was changed by either adding an 
item to, or deleting an item from, the baseline stimulus. Figure 7C is an example of a 
change in gap position, achieved by adding item 41 to the baseline design (stimulus 
design 1a05). Compared to the baseline stimulus design, the addition of item 41 increases 
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Stimulus design 1a02 Stimulus design 1a03 
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yellow items). The smaller subset for yellow implies that more uncertainty can be 
reduced by describing the target item (33) as yellow than as a triangle. Therefore from 
hypothesis 2, I expected that people would shift their choices towards yellow, the 
attribute with the smaller subset.  
In addition to the example in figure 7C, the following three stimulus designs were 
also included as examples of changes in gap position.  
 
Figure 9 – Gap position changes  
 
D. Both position and gap size  
Although I did not have a specific hypothesis dealing with both position and gap size 
simultaneously, 4 conditions were created to investigate potential interactions between 












Stimulus design 1a06 





Stimulus design 1a08 
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items 42, 43, 33, 35, 25, and 15. As can be observed from the comparison between 
Figures 7A and 7D, to achieve both changes, items were shifted away 1 unit in the 
direction of shape and item 15 was added simultaneously. In the baseline case (Figure 
7A), referring to the target (item 33) as either triangle or yellow corresponded with equal 
gap size (1unit distance) and position (subset size of 3 items each). Due to the changes, in 
Figure 7D it is possible to perceive a larger gap size for triangle (2 units distance) and an 
increased subset size for yellow (4 items vs. 3 for triangle). In this example, both the 
larger gap and the smaller subset for triangle imply that more uncertainty can be reduced 
by describing the target item (33) as a triangle than as yellow. Therefore, from hypothesis 
1 I expected that people would shift their choices toward triangle, the attribute with the 
larger gap. From hypothesis 2 I also expected that people would shift their choices 
toward triangle, the attribute with the smaller subset. Thus, the combined effect of both 
variables was expected to be larger in magnitude than the corresponding effects of either 
variable alone.  
In addition to the example in Figure 7D the following three stimulus designs were 
also included as examples of changes in both gap size and position.  
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Figure 10 – Gap size and position changes 
 
4.5.2 Families of stimulus designs and a coding scheme 
The previous examples, shown in Figures 7-10, constitute one complete family of 
stimulus designs: one baseline stimulus design and 11 different stimulus designs 
manipulated from the baseline. Because the entire experimental stimulus design is based 
on a two-dimensional grid, I was able to create 3 other families of stimuli with equivalent 
structures by rotating the grid 90, 180, and 270 degrees. For example, Figure 11 shows 
the baseline stimulus design described earlier, as well as three additional baseline 
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Stimulus design 1a10 Stimulus design 1a11 
Stimulus design 1a12 
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Figure 11 – Families of stimulus designs 
   
Similarly, I rotated each of the 11 stimulus designs described above to obtain 
three additional complete families of stimulus designs. Each family included designs with 
the same structures previously described: a baseline stimulus design, 3 designs with 
changes in gap size, 4 designs with changes in gap position, and 4 designs with changes 
in both gap size and position simultaneously. All together, the four families add up to 48 
different stimulus designs representing various manipulations of gap size and position.  
A coding scheme was used to label each of the various stimulus designs. I coded 
the first baseline stimulus (Figure 7A) as design 1a01. The first digit in the code (1 in this 
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case) referred to the rotation on the 5x5 grid. Since there were 4 different rotations, the 
first digit varied from 1 to 4. The last two digits referred to the different stimulus designs, 
which manipulated gap size and position in various ways. For instance, the two digits 
“01” identified a baseline stimulus design; 02 to 04 referred to changes in gap size only; 
05 to 08 referred to changes in gap position only; and 09 to 12 referred to changes in both 
gap size and gap position simultaneously.  
A letter (“a” in this example) was also included in the code to designate a 
particular combination of the various binary choices presented to participants in task 1 of 
the experiment. Specifically, there were six different binary choices for task 1 (red vs. 
yellow; triangle vs. circle; triangle vs. red; yellow vs. triangle; circle vs. yellow; and 
circle vs. red). However, because each stimulus design was rotated around the 5x5 grid, 
there were four different versions of each design, and a given binary choice in one 
rotation corresponded with a different binary choice in a different rotation. For instance, 
the binary choice triangle vs. yellow in rotation 1 was structurally equivalent to circle vs. 
yellow in rotation 2, circle vs. red in rotation 3, and triangle vs. red in rotation 4. Thus, 6 
sets of structurally equivalent binary choices were defined, coded with the letters “a” – 
“f”. Each set designated four structurally equivalent binary choices (one for each of the 
four rotations of the stimulus designs around the grid) for one of the six binary choices in 
task 1.   
Figure 12 summarizes the correspondence between different binary choices across 
the four rotations of the baseline stimulus. The four rows in the table represent the four 
rotations. The six columns, coded a-f, represent sets of structurally equivalent binary 
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choices across the four rotations. Although only the baseline stimulus design is shown in 
Figure 12, the same logic applies for all of the 12 stimulus designs in each family.  
 
 
Figure 12 – Six sets of equivalent binary choices structures for baseline stimulus conditions 
01 for rotations 1, 2, 3, and 4 
 
In addition to the four stimulus design families described above, I also designed 
two other families of designs which included various manipulations starting from a 
different baseline stimulus design. Although data were collected for these two families 
along with the other four, I decided not to report the results in the dissertation. 
Furthermore, I also decided not to report the results for stimulus designs involving 
simultaneous changes in both gap size and position in this dissertation. All the stimulus 
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design families (including those whose results are not being reported) and their respective 
codes are included in Appendix C.  
4.5.3 Method   
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, experiments 2 and 3 were conducted simultaneously using 
a single survey. Therefore, the experimental procedure, materials and participants were 
the same as those described earlier for experiment 2. 
Task 1. For task 1, participants were presented with a set of items and descriptions. Their 
goal was to rank the descriptions with respect to the items. Below is a sample of task 1. 
 
For this task, imagine you were trying to get another person to select the item indicated from the 
set of items shown below.  
The following 6 pairs of descriptions could be used to describe the circled item. For each pair 











1.  looks red  looks yellow 
2.  looks like a triangle  looks like a circle 
3.  looks like a triangle   looks red 
4.  looks yellow  looks like a triangle 
5.  looks like a circle  looks yellow 
6.  looks like a circle   looks red 
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Participants performed the above task 12 times in relation to 12 different stimulus 
designs.  
 
Task 2. Participants were given a set of items and one description. The objective was to 
rank the items with respect to the description. The following task is an example of task 2. 
 
Imagine you are communicating to a person in another room who has the following set of items. 
Your goal in this task is to correctly select items from the set based on descriptions provided by 
the other person. For each of the descriptions provided below please rank the items based on 
which one the person is most likely referring to (where rank of 1 is the “most likely”).  This task 
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 Participants performed the above task 12 times in relation to 12 different stimulus 
designs. 
Measures. In experiment 3, gap size and position were directly controlled in the design of 
the experimental stimulus. Hence, pairwise comparisons methods were used to examine 
differences between how participants responded to different stimulus designs with 
different sized gaps or different gap positions. The experiment was a within-subject 
design. To test for the effect of gap size, paired sample t-tests were used to examine 
differences in participant responses between the baseline stimulus design (gap 1 unit 
distance) and other stimulus designs with a larger gap size (gap size of 2 units distance). 
To test for the effect of gap position, paired sample t-tests were used to examine 
differences in participant responses between the baseline stimuli designs (with given 
subsets sizes of items) and other stimulus design with different subsets sizes (smaller 
subsets vs. larger subsets). 
More specifically, in task 1, participants performed a series of binary choices 
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between pairs of attributes, as to which of each pair would best describe the target item. 
To compare participants’ attribute choices between different stimulus conditions, the 
binary choice data were converted into ratios by summing the number of times 
participants chose each of the 4 attributes for a given target item. These ratios were used 
in the pairwise comparisons.  
In task 2, participants ranked the set of items with respect to each specific 
attribute description, and how participants ranked the target item against other items in 
the set were compared across different conditions. To compare ranks across different 
stimulus conditions with different numbers of items, the rank of the target item for each 
participant was converted into a standardized score by dividing the rank-value by the 
number of items in the set. These standardized ranks were used in the t-tests. 
4.5.4 Results  
Task 1 
A. Gap Size 
To test for the effect of gap size, paired sample t-tests were used to examine differences 
between participants’ choices of attributes between the baseline stimulus designs, with a 
gap size of 1 unit distance within the 5x5 grid, and other stimulus designs with gap sizes 
of 2 units. Gap size was manipulated with respect to both the size and shape dimensions 
of the 5x5 grid. Stimulus designs coded 02 used a gap of 2 units for the colour dimension 
(i.e., with respect to either red or yellow); designs coded 04 used a gap of 2 units for the 
shape dimension (i.e., either triangle or circle). See Appendix C for details of each 
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stimulus design. In each case, only some of the six binary choices were relevant for 
hypothesis testing, while others were not. For instance, if the attribute changing from 1-
unit to 2-unit gap size was yellow, only binary choices that included the attribute yellow 
were relevant (i.e., “yellow vs. red”, “yellow vs. triangle”, and “yellow vs. circle”), 
whereas other binary choices were irrelevant. In total, there were 6 binary choices 
relevant for hypothesis testing: 3 for the colour dimension (reported in Table 23) and 3 
for the shape dimension (reported in Table 24).   
For each of the 6 relevant binary choices, the t-test was used to compare ratios of 
participant choices for the attribute with the larger gap in the 2-unit gap condition, against 
ratios of choices for the same attribute in the baseline (1-unit gap) condition. As 
explained earlier, for any binary choice between two attributes there were four 
structurally equivalent choices, corresponding to the four rotations of the stimulus 
designs around the 5x5 grid (see columns “a”-“f” in Figure 12). Thus, for each t-test, n=4 
ratios for an attribute with a 1-unit gap in the baseline stimulus design were compared 
against n=4 ratios for the same attribute with a 2-unit gap in a different stimulus design. 
Because the same participants performed the binary choices in both stimulus conditions, 
this is a within-subjects experimental design, and paired sample t-tests were used.  
As an illustration, the ratios for one set of equivalent attribute binary choices (set 
“a”) for the 4 rotations of the baseline stimulus are shown in Table 22. The first column 
refers to the four different rotations of the baseline stimulus design. The second column 
identifies the equivalent binary choices of attributes for each rotation (labeled attribute 1 
and 2 to identify structurally equivalent attributes across the four rotations). The third and 
  120 
fourth columns indicate the number of participants who chose each of the two attributes, 
and the last two columns give the corresponding ratios of choices for each attribute. In 
the t-tests, one of the two ratios (ratio 1 or 2) would be used for pair-wise comparison 
between two stimulus conditions, depending on which ratio corresponded with the 
attribute with manipulated gap size. 
 
Table 22 – Example of an aggregated stimulus design with similar dimensional structure 
Table 23 summarizes paired samples t-test results for the three cases in which gap 
size was manipulated with respect to colour attributes (either red or yellow). In the table, 
gap 1 means (M) and standard deviations (SD) refer to the baseline stimulus designs with 
a gap size of 1 unit. Gap 2 M and SD refer to the four stimulus designs ending in 02 (for 
instance, 1a02, 2a02, 3a02, 4a02) with a gap size of 2 units. From Hypothesis 1, when 
people communicate about unstructured stimuli and they can choose among multiple 
attributes to describe the item, they are expected to choose the attribute that maximizes 
the gap size. Thus, I expected people to shift in their choices towards the attribute with 
the larger gap. Because this is a directional hypothesis, I expected gap 2 means to be 
greater than gap 1 means, and used 1-tailed probabilities to evaluate t-test results. The 
results were significant for all sets of the manipulations of gap size with respect to colour 
attributes, except for set d.  
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Table 23 – T-tests results for the baseline designs 01 and gap size stimulus designs 02 with 
respect to colour 
 
 
Table 24 summarizes paired samples t-test results for the three cases in which gap 
size was manipulated with respect to shape attributes (either triangle or circle). The result 
was significant for sets a. For sets c and f, the results were not significant using a 1-tailed 
test.  
 
Table 24  – T-tests results for the baseline designs 01 and gap size stimulus designs 04 with 
respect to shape 
 
B. Gap Position 
To test for the effect of gap position, paired sample t-tests were used to examine 
differences between the ratios of participants’ attribute choices between the baseline 
stimulus design and other designs with either larger or smaller subsets of items for a 
given attribute. Stimulus designs coded 05 and 06 differed from the baseline design by 
adding an item to one of the attributes. Designs coded 07 and 08 differed from the 
baseline design by deleting an item from one of the attributes. There were 8 relevant 
cases of manipulations to gap position, as shown in Tables 25-28. See Appendix C for 
details of the relevant design variations. 
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Hypothesis 2 stated that when people have to communicate unstructured stimuli 
and they have a choice among alternative attributes to describe the item they would chose 
the one which maximizes information gain by choosing the attribute that minimizes the 
subset size containing the target item. Thus, in any of the pairwise comparisons I 
expected people to shift in their choices toward the attribute with the smaller subset size, 
referred to as “position 2” in Tables 25-28 (“position 1” refers to the baseline design). 
Because this is a directional hypothesis, I expected position 2 means to be greater than 
position 1 means, and used 1-tailed probabilities to evaluate t-test results. As shown in 
Tables 25-28, the results were not significant for the manipulations of gap position with 
respect to the addition of an item (designs ending in 05 and 06) but they were significant 
for those with respect to the deletion of an item (designs ending in 07 and 08).  
   
Table 25 – T-tests results for the baseline stimulus designs 01 and gap position stimulus 




Table 26 – T-tests results for the baseline stimulus designs 01 and gap position stimulus 




Table 27 – T-tests results for the baseline stimulus designs 01 and gap position stimulus 
designs 07, by deletion of an item 





Table 28 – T-tests results for the baseline stimulus designs 01 and gap position stimulus 




For task 2, participants were given a set of items and four attributes or descriptions: 
triangle, circle, yellow, and red. Their goal was to rank the items with respect to each 
attribute, based on the likelihood that the attribute was referring to each of the items. 
Therefore, the data collected from task 2 was a direct rank of the items with respect to 
each attribute, for each stimulus design. As in Task 1, the various stimulus designs 
manipulated either gap size or gap position. The following results summarize the effects 
of gap size and position on how the target item was ranked by participants with respect to 
the four attributes. Specifically, paired sample t-tests compared participants’ ranks of the 
target item with respect to each attribute for the baseline stimulus design, against the 
corresponding target item ranks for the other stimulus designs. 
As noted earlier, I used standardized rank scores because the number of items in 
the different stimulus designs varied from 4 to 5 depending on the stimulus. As with task 
1, stimulus designs of equivalent dimensional structure, based on different rotations of 
the stimulus around the 5x5 grid, were aggregated together for analysis of task 2. In 
addition, however, because the data for task 2 consisted of each individual’s ranks (rather 
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than ratios of all participants’ choices in task 1) the sample sizes were large enough to 
also conduct separate t-tests for each of the 4 stimulus rotations, rather than just a single 
aggregate test for a given design using the combined data from all 4 rotations. Thus, five 
t-tests were conducted for each pairwise comparison between participants’ rankings of 
the target item for a given attribute for the baseline stimulus vs. another stimulus design: 
one for each of the four rotations separately, and one for the aggregate responses of the 
four rotations together.   
A. Gap Size 
To test for the effect of gap size, paired sample t-tests were used to examine differences 
between participants’ target item rankings between the baseline stimulus designs with a 
gap size of 1 grid distance unit, and other stimulus designs with gap sizes of 2 units. As 
explained for task 1, gap size was manipulated with respect to both the size and shape 
dimensions of the 5x5 grid. Stimulus designs coded 02 used a gap of 2 units for the 
colour dimension (i.e., with respect to either red or yellow); designs coded 04 used a gap 
of 2 units for the shape dimension (i.e., either triangle or circle). See Appendix C for 
details of each stimulus design. The t-test results for 02 designs are reported in Table 29 
and the results for 04 designs are reported in Table 30.  
For the gap size manipulations, I expected people to shift toward the attribute with 
the larger gap size. In terms of how participants ranked the target item, this corresponds 
with an expectation of relatively lower numerical ranks for the attribute with the larger 
gap size. Because the hypothesis is directional, one-tailed t-tests were used to assess the 
results. 
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With respect to manipulations of gap size for colour attributes, Table 29 shows 
that there was not a significant difference in any of the cases tested.  
 
Table 29 – Task 2 t-tests results for the baseline design 01 vs. gap size stimulus design 02 
with respect to colour 
 
 Table 30 shows the t-test results for manipulations of gap size for shape attributes. 
Results were significant for two of the four separate rotations and for the rotations 
aggregated. 
Table 30 – Task 2 t-tests results for the baseline design 01 vs. gap size stimulus design 04 
with respect to shape 
 
B. Gap position 
To test for the effect of gap position, paired sample t-tests were used to examine 
differences in participants’ ranking of the target item between the baseline stimulus 
design and other designs with either larger or smaller subsets of items for a given 
attribute. As explained for task 1, there were four different stimulus designs that 
manipulated gap position by either adding or deleting an item with respect to one of the 
attribute subsets. For each of 05-08 designs, the gap position manipulations resulted in 
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two sets of structurally equivalent stimuli (sets “a” and “b” as shown in Figure 12), so the 
results for the two sets are reported separately below (two Tables for each stimulus 
design). For each set of stimulus designs to be compared with the baseline design, four 
separate t-tests were conducted for each rotation of the stimulus, as well as one test for 
the four aggregated rotations. All together, this resulted in a total of 80 t-tests, as shown 
in Tables 31-34. See Appendix C for details of the relevant design variations. 
From hypothesis 2, I expected people to shift toward the attribute corresponding 
with the smaller subset containing the target item. In terms of how participants ranked the 
target item, this corresponds with an expectation of relatively lower numerical ranks for 
the attribute with the smaller subset. Because the hypothesis is directional, one-tailed t-
tests were used to assess the results.  
As shown in table 31, for the baseline stimulus design and stimulus design 05, 
there was significant difference between the single family-rotation 4 set a for red but not 
for triangle and there was also a significant difference for the single family-rotation 4 set 
b for both yellow and circle. There was also a significant difference for the sets b shape 
aggregated stimuli designs. 
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Table 31 – Task 2 t-tests results for the baseline stimulus design 01 vs. gap position stimulus design 05, by addition of an item 
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For gap position between the baseline stimulus design 01 and gap position 06, 
with respect to the single rotations, as shown in table 32, some results were significant for 
family-rotations 1, and 3. Result was also significant for three of the aggregated rotations. 
All other results were not significant. 
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Table 32 – Task 2 t-tests results for the baseline stimulus design 01 vs. gap position stimulus design 06, by addition of an item
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The position of the gap was manipulated twice by deleting an item from the 
baseline stimulus design. Since I tested the two types of manipulations for the two 
different sets, sets a and b, there are also 2 t-tests for each of the stimuli designs that were 
grouped together and 2 tables of t-tests for each of the single rotations. As shown in 
Tables 33 and 34, some of the scores between rotations conditions showed significant 
differences, others did not. From the single family-rotations, 14 results were significant 
and 18 were not significant. With respect to the aggregated rotations, 5 results were 
significant and 3 were not significant. 
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Table 33 – Task 2 t-tests results for the baseline stimulus design 01 vs. gap position stimulus design 07, by deletion of an item 
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Table 34 – Task 2 t-tests results for the baseline stimulus design 01 vs. gap position stimulus design 08, by deletion of an item
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Because the results of the t-tests were not as good as I was expecting I decided to 
conduct sign tests to investigate whether or not the cases studied were at least in the direction 
predicted by the hypotheses. The sign tests were run for both tasks 1 and 2.  
In task 1, I conducted sign tests in all the aggregated cases for all rotations. I 
aggregated all the cases of changes in gap size related to colour attribute (aggregated designs 
02) and all the cases related to shape attribute (aggregated designs 04). Next I aggregated 
colour and shape attributes together. Therefore the final sign test result is an aggregation of 
all the manipulations of gap size. Gap position was aggregated in a similar way but with an 
additional step. First the aggregated designs 05 were put together. Then the aggregated 
designs 06. In parallel, designs 07 and 08 were treated similarly. Next, designs 05 and 06 
were put together because both of them were manipulation of gap position by addition of an 
item. Being manipulation of gap position by deletion of an item, designs 07 and 8 were also 
aggregated. Finally, all of those gap position manipulation designs were aggregated.   
Due to the different nature of task 2 data collection, I conducted sign tests for both the 
aggregated cases across designs and the aggregated cases for all rotations. The aggregated 
cases for all the rotations is similar to the explained above for task 1. In addition, however, 
because the data for task 2 consisted of each individual’s ranks, t-tests were run for each 
single design, rather than just a single aggregate test for a given design using the combined 
data from all 4 rotations. Therefore, I also aggregated those cases across designs and conduct 
sign tests as observed in Table 35.   
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The vast majority of the cases studied were in the right direction as predicted by the 
hypotheses. In task 1, the sign test for both gap size and position were significant, with p = 
0.031, and p = 0.008, respectively. In task 2, with respect to the aggregated analysis across 
designs, the gap position results were statistically significant, p < 0.001, and, although the 
gap size results were not statistically significant, 5 out of 8 of the cases were in the right 
direction. With respect to the aggregated analysis for all rotations, 1 out of 2 cases for the gap 




Table 35 - Sign tests on fraction of cases in predicted directions across all conditions in tasks 1 
and 2 
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4.5.5 Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 states that during the communication process if people have a choice among 
multiple attributes to describe an item, they will choose the attribute that maximizes the size 
of gap. Hypothesis 2 says that they will choose the attribute that minimizes the size of the 
subset containing the target item. In general, the results of experiment 3 gave inconsistent 
support for hypotheses 1 and 2.  For task 1, the t-test results indicated that the effects of both 
gap size and gap position on participants’ attribute choices were significant in 50% of the 
cases. For task 2, the results supported the gap size hypothesis in 3 out of 10 t-tests and the 
gap position hypothesis in 30 out of 80 t-tests. The vast majority of the sign tests cases were 
in the direction predicted by the hypotheses.  
Because experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with the hypotheses and the sign tests 
cases pointed to the right direction, the following considerations are made, in an attempt to 
account for the present findings.  
First, I want to point out that an important advantage to the stimulus design in 
experiment 3 is that it allowed for manipulation and control of gap size and gap position 
independently. The use of the 5x5 grid as a basis for the design allowed for a more precise 
way of controlling changes in the two variables, compared to the stimuli used in experiments 
1 and 2, which depended on naturally occurring variation in the two variables. The hope, 
therefore, was that the 5x5 grid design would provide a tighter way of testing the hypotheses.  
Unfortunately there were also certain drawbacks to the structured stimulus design, which 
may have contributed to the inconsistent results.  
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One potential drawback is that the design may have lacked sufficient measurement 
precision, due to limited variability in the stimulus designs or in the choices given to 
participants. In task 1, for example, participants made binary choices between pairs of 
attributes to describe a target item in relation to the other items in the set. However, because 
there were only four attributes (triangle, circle, red, yellow), there were not many possible 
variations available to participants to rank the items. Task 2 was a direct ranking task, in 
which the participants ranked a set of items with respect to one attribute. The number of 
items in a set varied from 4 to 6 items, again providing relatively little room for variable 
ranking responses on the part of participants. In both case, the lack of variability in response 
might have limited the measurement precision for detecting small differences in participants’ 
preferences or perceptions between different stimulus conditions. The lack in variability 
perhaps could explain why the hypotheses were not supported in some of the t-tests, although 
the sign tests indicated that they are in the direction predicted by the hypotheses. I discuss 
possible solutions to these issues under future research.  
Another measurement precision issue was due to the small sample sizes used in the t-
tests for task 1. Because task 1 involved binary choices, the t-tests were run on sets of only 4 
ratios, where each ratio was an aggregate indicator of all participants’ choices for one 
rotation of a given stimulus design. With a sample size of only 4, the t-test becomes very 
conservative, making it difficult to achieve statistical significance when there is any 
inconsistency in the data. Task 2 was analyzed at the level of individual participant rankings, 
with larger samples sizes, and more of the results did come out significant.  
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Finally, another aspect to be considered is that in some of the stimulus designs, especially 
those in which gap size was increased, there might have been an additional factor operating 
besides the hypothesized effects due to gap size and position. The gap size hypothesis 
predicted that people would shift their choices toward the attribute with a larger gap. That is, 
the stimulus design operationalizes the categorization logic by creating a gap between the 
category containing the target item and the category containing the remaining items, which is 
larger for one attribute than for another attribute. However, in addition to creating a 
difference in gap size between the two attributes, stimulus designs that varied gap size also 
had the effect of varying the internal degree of similarity (or homogeneity) within the two 
attribute categories. For example, by creating a larger gap between the triangle and non-
triangle categories, an additional effect might be to reduce the degree of similarity of items in 
the yellow category compared to items in the triangle category. That is an additional effect, 
not predicted by the hypothesis, which could not be controlled in the current design of the 





This work investigated how people communicate about ambiguous, unstructured stimuli. 
Problems arise in many empirical communication settings, such as learning, research, 
innovation, or new product development, where people must develop some form of structure 
to communicate effectively about ambiguous new ideas, product concepts, and so on.   
I investigated the cognitive mechanisms that people use to identify and describe a 
specific ambiguous item from among a set of ambiguous items during communication. 
According to Shannon’s information theory (1948), uncertainty is reduced and information 
conveyed in communication with respect to a predefined set of possibilities. Therefore an 
unstructured stimulus can be communicated only after some structure has been established 
which can be used to distinguish among a set of possibilities. This amounts to a 
categorization process, whereby a set of ambiguous items are divided into subsets based on 
similarity judgments. I proposed that people use judgments of similarity to create structure by 
drawing distinctions between items, with respect to perceived dimensions or attributes, by 
which the items can be compared to one another. More specifically, I proposed that items are 
categorized based on perceived relative similarity, whereby similarity is maximized within 
categories and minimized between categories with respect to one attribute. 
Assuming a one-way communication from sender to receiver, I postulated that when 
multiple attributes are available for describing a target item, the sender perceives various 
ways of clustering the target item based on how similar/dissimilar it is to the other items with 
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respect to the various attributes, and chooses the attribute/description that best distinguishes 
the target from the other items in the set. Similarly, given a certain attribute as a description 
of an item (i.e., as a message) the receiver uses similarity judgments to select the cluster, or 
subset, of items that are best described by that attribute. I hypothesized that the chosen 
attribute is the one that most reduces uncertainty by 1. maximizing the difference between 
the cluster containing the target and the cluster of the other items, and, 2. minimizing the size 
of the subset containing the target item (i.e., by eliminating as many of the non-target items 
as possible). I have used the term gap to refer to the difference in perceived relative similarity 
between the subset containing the target item and the subset of remaining items. The first 
hypothesis deals with the size of the gap and the second deals with its position with respect to 
the particular attribute used as the basis for similarity judgments.  
Three experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses. In two of the experiments I 
used unstructured stimuli (random line drawings and Rorschach inkblots) and in one of them 
I used a structured stimulus (items of varying shape and colour based on a 5x5 grid). The 
unstructured stimuli were multidimensional, so participants could perceive a diverse variety 
of attributes that could be used to cluster the items and draw distinctions between them. The 
attributes/descriptions used in these experiments were realistic, in the sense that they were 
based on how people had actually described the items in prior experimental or therapeutic 
settings. With respect to the hypotheses, the multidimensional stimuli provide random 
variation in the size and position of the gap for any of the dimensions.  
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The structured stimulus was designed with two dimensions (shape and colour), which 
allowed for controlled manipulation of gap size and position to test the hypotheses. 
Specifically, because each item had a fixed position in the 5x5 grid, the relative similarity of 
items could be varied by discrete amounts with respect to the four attributes triangle, circle, 
red, and yellow, where the assumption in the design is that perceived similarity should 
correlate closely with distances between items in the grid. 
The results from experiments 1 and 2 gave evidence consistent with what would be 
expected if hypotheses 1 and 2 were true. Both experiments consisted of three tasks. Tasks 1 
and 3 took the communication sender’s point of view and participants were asked to rank 
various attributes in terms of how descriptive they were of the target item with respect to the 
set of items. Task 2 took the receiver point of view and participants were asked to rank the 
set of items with respect to one specific description. Correlation and regression analyses were 
used to examine the relationship between the senders’ attribute rankings (tasks 1 and 3) and 
the receivers’ item rankings (task 2).  The results showed strong correlations between the two 
kinds of rankings, suggesting attributes that are more descriptive from the point of view of 
senders are also more selective from the point of view of receivers. The regression results 
further showed that differences in attribute ranks by senders had large, statistically significant 
effects on differences in item ranks by receivers. The results of experiments 1 and 2, using 
two different kinds of stimuli, were very consistent and therefore provided strong evidence 
for generalizability of the observed effects.  
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With respect to the gap position hypothesis, higher ranked attributes should narrow 
the set of items down to relatively small subsets containing the target item, whereas lower 
ranked attributes do not give much reduction in the subset size. In terms of the gap size 
hypothesis, increases (decreases) in an attribute’s rank by senders should correspond with 
increased (decreased) selectivity of the attribute for receivers. The correlation and regression 
results are consistent with both of these hypotheses. However, they are also consistent with a 
more general process of similarity judgment rather than the specific gap size and position 
theory proposed. Furthermore I could not measure gap position and size directly in 
experiments 1 and 2, so experiment 3 was designed as a more direct test.  
In experiment 3, gap size and position were directly controlled for in the design of the 
experimental stimulus. Hence, the two hypotheses were tested directly through pairwise 
comparisons methods. Participants performed two tasks. In task one they took the role of 
communication sender and performed a series of binary choices, rating different attributes 
with respect to which would best describe the target item. In task two they took the role of 
communication receiver and ranked a set of items with respect to which was best described 
by the four attributes triangle, circle, red, and yellow. Hypothesis testing was based on 
differences between stimulus conditions with different gap sizes and positions, in how 
participants described the target item in task one and how they ranked the target item in task 
two. To test for the effect of gap size, paired-sample t-tests were used to examine differences 
between the baseline stimulus designs (gap size of 1 unit distance within the grid) and other 
stimulus design with a larger gap size (of 2 units distance). To test for the effect of gap 
position, paired-sample t-tests were used to examine differences between the baseline 
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stimulus designs (with given subset sizes of items) and other stimulus design with different 
subset sizes (smaller subsets sizes of items vs. larger subsets sizes of items). 
Unfortunately, the results of experiment 3 gave inconsistent support for hypotheses 1 
and 2. For task one, 50% of the results from the t-tests for differences in gap size and 50% of 
the results for differences in gap position were significant. For task two 30% of the t-tests for 
differences in gap size and about 40% of the t-tests for differences in gap position came out 
statistically significant. Therefore, in general, the results for hypotheses 3 were inconsistent. 
Sign tests were therefore used to aggregated the various specific cases to test whether the 
overall direction of responses were consistent with the hypotheses.  The vast majority of the 
cases studied were in the right direction as predicted by the hypotheses. In task 1, the sign 
test for both gap size and position were significant, with p = 0.031, and p = 0.008, 
respectively. In task 2, with respect to the aggregated analysis across designs, the gap 
position results were statistically significant, p < 0.001, and, although the gap size results 
were not statistically significant, 5 out of 8 of the cases were in the right direction. With 
respect to the aggregated analysis for all rotations, 1 out of 2 cases for the gap size were in 
the right direction and gap position was statistically significant, p = 0.001. 
In the previous sections I suggested two potential shortcomings of the experimental 
design that may have accounted for the inconsistent results: first, the lack in variability, that 
is, the 5x5 grid did not allow for enough complexity in the stimuli designs; and, second, the 
sample size was not large enough to detect differences in task one. Because the results of the 
unstructured stimuli in experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with the hypotheses and the 
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majority of the sign tests in experiment 3 pointed in the right direction of the hypotheses 
more investigation is needed for a definite conclusion. 
5.1 Contributions 
This study brings valuable contributions to the fields of categorization and communication in 
terms of both theory and research methods. The current literature in the field of 
categorization and communication is very limited, and Markman and Ross (2003) noted a 
lack of connection between these fields. Very little work has investigated how humans 
process unstructured stimuli to communicate about it. This dissertation makes a direct 
connection between categorization and communication by focusing on how we use 
categorization processes, including perceptions of similarity and difference with respect to an 
item’s perceived attributes, to communicate unstructured information. In this work I used 
Shannon’s information theory (Shannon, 1949) to analyze how information works to reduce 
uncertainty through the development of structure, which I conceptualized in terms of a 
system of categories. I also used Rosch’s and her associates (1978) concept of relative 
similarity to explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in the development of those 
categories.  
This study also points to a new way of understanding of the concept “feature” or 
“attribute”. In the literature, “feature” typically means a property or characteristic possessed 
by members of a category (Tversky, 1977, Rosch, 1978). In this work, I use the terms 
“feature” or “attribute” to mean any basis for categorizing an item, which could include 
perceived overall similarity or the sharing of one property in common. By having categorized 
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the item a certain way, this then becomes a single attribute along which relative degrees of 
similarity of different items can be compared.  
Note I am not arguing that possession of a specific attribute is identical to overall 
similarity between two items or a perceived resemblance between an item and some third 
thing such as a mental image, a category prototype etc. I am simply arguing that any of these 
bases for categorization can be used to draw distinctions among a set of ambiguous items for 
the purpose of information processing in communication. So I use the term attribute in 
general to refer to any of these various ways of drawing distinctions as a basis for 
categorization.  
This work also points to a new understanding of “relative similarity”, in which two 
entities are relatively similar to one another with respect to “one” attribute. In Rosch and 
Mervis’ studies (1975), relative similarity (or what they called “family resemblance”) refers 
to overall similarity of category members vs. non-members, measured in terms of the relative 
number of features in common, from a set of attributes that are characteristic of the category. 
Such an approach may account for the structure of categories associated with a person’s 
conceptual structure, reflecting concept knowledge that is relatively stable over time. By 
contrast, this research investigates how people communicate one item from a set of 
ambiguous items for which a set of preconceived conceptual categories is not available. For 
this specific communication purpose, the use of categorization processes is different from 
that studied by Rosch and Mervis (1975). I propose that people take advantage of the 
perceived structure of the ambiguous stimulus and form categories, in a goal-directed manner 
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(Barsalou, 1983), in order to distinguish the target item from other items in the set and 
communicate the message. The categories developed might not be permanent. Similarity 
judgments are used to create ad hoc goal-directed categories that enable information 
processing with respect to specific communication goals in specific communication 
situations. To form such goal-directed categories, people focus on whatever attributes best 
enable them to distinguish the target item from the others (Barsalou, 1983). Given a different 
communication goal of distinguishing a different target item, people will focus on different 
attributes and form different categories.  
Note that I use the word similarity also in a general way to refer to various 
perceptual processes associated with perceiving distinctions. For instance, perceiving that 
two or more ambiguous items may share a common feature or bare an overall resemblance to 
one another or a similarity to some thing else such as an image or an object in the world. The 
new ways of understanding attributes and relative similarity developed in this thesis are both 
contributions to the field of categorization itself. 
This dissertation has also made methodological contributions. I have introduced 
methods that utilize both structured and unstructured stimuli in a communication setting. I 
developed two of the stimuli-drawings, (the structured grid and the unstructured random 
drawings), and used Rorschach inkblots for the second unstructured stimulus. I developed a 
series of three one-way communication tasks. Two of them had the sender’s view and one 
had the receiver’s view of communication. Moreover, those tasks were designed with two 
different ranking methods, in two tasks I used a direct rank method, and in one task I used a 
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binary choice method. Moreover, for the two unstructured stimuli, to come up with lists of 
attributes to describe the items, I used real descriptions that had actually been used by people 
to refer to the items in previous communication situations. The use of ambiguous stimuli 
drawn from realistic previous communication situations contributes to the generalizability of 
the results to our daily experience with real life information processing of ambiguous stimuli 
and can facilitate other exploratory studies. 
5.2 Limitations 
There are limitations to this research. Some of those limitations were methodological and 
might have affected hypotheses results. In experiments 1 and 2, the use of unstructured 
stimuli was an advantage but also brought some limitations. One of those limitations, as 
already mentioned, was incomplete data, whereby each item was ranked with respect to 
specific attributes but not all attributes were ranked with respect to all items. As mentioned, 
the attributes that I used were drawn from real descriptions of the stimulus items in previous 
communication settings. People had seen the pictures and had used some descriptions to 
identify similarities and dissimilarities among those cards/pictures. For the tasks in the 
experiments, I selected some of those attributes. However, some of the attributes were only 
applicable to one of the pictures; others were descriptive of two or three of the pictures; none 
had been previously used to describe all the different pictures. Although it would have been 
possible to select a fixed set of attributes and arbitrarily use them across all items in 
experiments 1 and 2, this would have reduced the realism of the task by asking participants to 
rate items with respect to unrelated attributes. The length of time needed for participants to 
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complete the survey was also taken into account in the decision. For instance, task 1 in 
experiment 1 contained 36 binary choices and each participant had to perform two of those 
tasks. If each attribute had been used for all of the 6 cards in this task, the amount of work 
would not be reasonable.  
Other potential limitations were related to the design of the 5x5 grid used in 
experiment 3. On one hand the grid allowed for a fixed location of each item, allowing for 
controlled and consistent manipulation of gap size and of gap position. Because the stimulus 
designs were all based on a small 5x5 grid, they could have a variability issue in terms of the 
limited ranking options available to participants, making it difficult to detect small 
differences between different stimulus designs. The design was based on the assumption that 
the perceived similarity between items should correlate closely with distance between items 
in the 5x5 grid. Each stimulus design contained the target item (item 33) and 3 to 5 other 
items from the grid depending on the different manipulations. Because the grid allowed for 
only five positions in either dimension, the use of rank measures (vs., continuous scales etc.) 
meant that opportunities for participants to rank the target differently from one condition to 
the next were limited.  
Finally, it is also possible that the survey data collected in the experiments contained 
some degree of noise. The participants received their survey by e-mail and completed their 
tasks at places and times of their own convenience. Although instructions were provided in 
the forms, it is possible that some participants did not complete their tasks with care. When it 
was possible to identify with a high degree of certainty that a task had not been completed 
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correctly, the participant’s responses were removed from the dataset. Otherwise, it was 
considered as random error. To address the problem, the surveys could be perhaps reduced in 
length so that participants would spend less time answering them. In addition, instead of 
being surveyed at home without supervision, individuals or small groups of individuals could 
be invited to complete the survey in a central lab location, in the presence of the researcher. 
5.3 Future research 
There are some promising directions for future research that emerged from this study. First, 
future research could investigate the problem of structuring ambiguous stimuli in other 
communication contexts. For instance, an organization in which various different 
departments are involved with the development of a new process or product would be a good 
setting to study the issue, using case study or other field methodologies.  
There are also potential future research directions related to addressing some of the 
methodological limitations of the current study. As mentioned before the two hypotheses 
could not be directly tested with the unstructured stimuli in experiments 1 and 2 because they 
did not allow for direct manipulation and control of gap size and gap position. Experiment 3 
used a two-dimensional 5x5 grid to provide more precise manipulation and control of the two 
variables, but it may have lacked sufficient variability in the choices available to participants 
to detect small changes in their similarity judgments. One possible way to deal with the issue 
would be to enlarge the 5x5 grid. By using a 10x10 grid, for instance, one would be 
increasing the complexity of the stimuli designs. The differences between adjacent items 
   149 
would decrease, therefore there would be more variability among them. Despite the change, I 
would still be able to efficiently manipulate and control for the two variables.  
Another possible solution for the variability problem would be to add more 
dimensions to the design as distractors (or noise). Participants would have more dimensions 
to pay attention to, which increases the complexity of the design. A possible downside to this 
kind of solution is that it could decrease the accuracy of the manipulation and control of the 
variables. A third possible way to handle the variability issue is to use a Likert scale measure 
instead of the simple binary choices. The binary choices allow the participant to choose 
between two attributes, for instance, triangle or yellow, but does not allow the participant to 
say how yellow an item is. The use of a scale would introduce more variability allowing 
participants to express small changes in perceived similarity that are missed by the simpler 
binary choice measurement approach.  
In conclusion, because the two hypotheses could not be appropriately tested there is 
still some doubt about their validity. I would like to test their veracity before anything else. If 
the hypotheses are correct, other ideas could be explored. For instance, although I developed 
experiment 3 stimulus designs that manipulated both, gap size and position simultaneously I 
decided not to test them in this dissertation. Additional stimuli designs were created, by 
manipulating only one of the dimensions (shape or colour) at a time. Those were not included 
in this research either. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
This work investigated the cognitive mechanisms involved in developing a suitable structure 
for communication about ambiguous stimuli. Shannon’s information theory (Shannon, 1948) 
was very useful to explain how communication is structure dependent. That is, human 
information processing works to reduce uncertainty through the development of structure. 
Structure was conceptualized in terms of a system of categories and Rosch and her 
associates’ concept of relative similarity (or family resemblance, as in Rosch and Mervis, 
1975) was used to explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in the development of the 
categories during the communication process.  
I assumed that when people have to communicate categories that are not well defined, 
they use relative similarity to cluster items into smaller subsets. I proposed that people use 
similarity judgments to create structure by dividing a complex unstructured stimulus into a 
set of categories. More specifically, items are categorized based on perceived relative 
similarity, whereby similarity is maximized within categories and minimized between 
categories with respect to one attribute. Further, I postulated that when multiple attributes are 
involved, the sender perceives various ways of clustering the target item based on how 
similar/dissimilar it is with respect to the set of items. In addition, I postulated that when 
dealing with multiple perceived attributes, the sender of the message chooses the attribute 
that best distinguishes the target item from the other items in the set. Similarly, the receiver 
must identify the subset of items that are best distinguished by the given attribute. I 
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hypothesized that the chosen attribute is the one that reduces uncertainty by 1. maximizing 
the difference between the cluster which contains the target and the cluster of the other items, 
and 2. minimizing the size of the subset containing the target item (i.e. by eliminating as 
many of the non-target items as possible).  The receiver receives the message (i.e., attribute) 
designating the subset or cluster. S/he experiences uncertainty regarding which item(s) is(are) 
best described by that message. Based on similarity judgments, the receiver creates clusters 
that best match their understanding of the sender’s intended clustering. Therefore, structure is 
built based on how both people, sender and receiver, perceived similarity between various 
attributes/clusterings and used the varying messages to communicate their perceived 
clusterings.  
The reported experiments provided partial support for the above conceptualization, 
showing that attributes that are more descriptive from the point of view of the sender also end 
up being more selective from the point of view of the receiver, which is consistent with the 
argument of gap position and gap size, as it is showed in the hypotheses. Unfortunately, the 
direct tests for the hypotheses in experiment 3 were not conclusive.   
The present research has developed a framework for a problem not addressed before 
in the literature. Although the literature addresses the development of more permanent and 
stable structures, which can be further retrieved from memory and used to make 
comparisons, it does not address the development of goal-directed categories, i.e. temporary 
categories used to select the message to be communicated. When two people are given an 
ambiguous set of items and must communicate one item from that set, they make use of 
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categorization processes to distinguish among the items.  They perceive various attributes 
that allow them to judge relative similarity among the items and describe the target item in 
terms of the attribute that best distinguishes it from the others. This results in two goal-
directed subcategories; one that contains the target item and one that does not. Because these 
categories are formed on the fly, based on specific communication goals, once the item has 
been communicated they may serve no further purpose for the person, and might even be 
forgotten.  
In addition to the main theoretical contribution, this work makes three other potential 
theoretical and methodological contributions. First, the research framework puts together two 
large fields of knowledge, categorization and communication. Communication is structure 
dependent and structure is created through the development of a system of categories. 
Second, a substantial method was developed. The method contained unstructured and 
structured stimuli allowing for manipulation and control of the variables. The one-way 
communication tasks used two different types of ranking tasks and two different 
perspectives, the sender’s view and the receiver’s view of the message. Finally, it offered 
theoretical contributions to the categorization theory by providing a new way of looking to 
the concepts of “attribute” and “relative similarity”.   
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 Surveys 
Following is one sample survey for experiment 1. All together there were 18 different survey versions 
as described in the method section. 
 










































1.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		 	 has	an	“M”		
3.	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	
4.	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	 	 looks	like	a	function	
5.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		 	 looks	like	a	function	
7.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 looks	like	a	function	
8.	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
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10.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
11.	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		
12.	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
13.	 	 it’s	a	wrench	 	 has	an	“M”		
14.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
15.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	
16.	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	 	 it’s	a	wrench	
17.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	
18.	 	 has	an	“M”		 	 looks	like	a	function	
19.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	
20.	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		
21.	 	 it’s	a	wrench	 	 looks	like	a	function	
22.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	
23.	 	 has	an	“M”		 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
24.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 it’s	a	wrench	
25.	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	 	 has	an	“M”		
26.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		
27.	 	 ends	with	a	straight	line	and	a	little	hook	 	 has	an	“M”		
28.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 it’s	a	wrench	
29.	 	 it’s	a	wrench	 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
30.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		
31.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 has	an	“M”		
32.	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	 	 looks	like	a	function	
33.	 	 looks	like	a	spiral	 	 tips	very	close	to	each	other	
34.	 	 it’s	a	wrench	 	 looks	like	a	dinosaur		
35.	 	 looks	like	a	bullet	 	 looks	like	a	function	
36.	 	 	it’s	an	“A”	if	vertically	oriented	 	 has	an	“M”		





1.	 	 has	a	finger	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	snake	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	
4.	 	 has	a	finger	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	snake	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
6.	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	
7.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 has	a	finger	
8.	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		 	 has	a	finger	
9.	 	 looks	like	a	snake	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	
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11.	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
12.	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
13.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		
14.	 	 has	a	finger	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	
15.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	
16.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 looks	like	a	snake	
17.	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	 	 has	a	finger	
18.	 	 has	a	finger	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
19.	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
20.	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
21.	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		 	 looks	like	a	shoe	
22.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	
23.	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
24.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
25.	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	
26.	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	
27.	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		 	 looks	like	a	snake	
28.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	
29.	 	 looks	like	an	“at”	sign	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
30.	 	 has	a	finger	 	 looks	like	a	snake	
31.	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
32.	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
33.	 	 looks	like	a	function	 	 looks	like	a	turtle	
34.	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	 	 looks	like	a	broken	phone	
35.	 	 looks	like	a	snake	 	 looks	like	a	shoe	
36.	 	 	lines	start	in	opposite	corners	 	 looks	like	a	cactus		
	 	




character.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 		
	 Card	1 Card	2 Card	3 
Card	6 Card	5 Card	4 
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Expression	2:	The	person	describes	one	of	these	6	items	as	has	2	and	½	fingers.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	




around	its	tail.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Expression	5:	The	person	describes	one	of	these	6	items	as	looks	like	a	tornado.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
Expression	6:	The	person	describes	one	of	these	6	items	as	looks	like	a	hand.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
Expression	7:	The	person	describes	one	of	these	6	items	as	has	an	“M”.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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Expression	8:	The	person	describes	one	of	these	6	items	as	ends	with	a	straight	
line	and	a	little	hook.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
Expression	9:	The	person	describes	one	of	these	6	items	as	looks	like	a	spiral.	Please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	card	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to.	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely)			 Card	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 		
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Experiments 2 and 3 Surveys 
Following is one sample survey for experiment 2. All together there were 12 different survey versions as described in the method section. 
 






	By	signing	this	consent	form,	you	are	not	waiving	your	legal	rights	or	releasing	the	investigator(s)	or	involved	institution(s)	from	their	legal	and	professional	responsibilities.		______________________________________________________________________	 	I	have	read	the	information	presented	in	the	information	letter	about	the	study	conducted	by	Geovania	Pimenta	under	the	supervision	of	Professor	Rob	Duimering,	Department	of	Management	Sciences,	University	of	Waterloo.	I	have	had	the	opportunity	to	ask	any	questions	related	to	this	study,	to	receive	satisfactory	answers	to	my	questions,	and	any	additional	details	I	wanted.	I	am	aware	that	I	may	withdraw	from	the	study	without	penalty	at	any	time	by	advising	the	researchers	of	this	decision.	I	am	also	aware	that	I	may	still	be	granted	the	1	bonus-mark	in	MSCI	211	by	completing	and	submitting	the	alternative	assignment	by	August	10,	2015.		This	project	has	been	reviewed	by,	and	received	ethics	clearance	through,	the	Office	of	Research	Ethics	at	the	University	of	Waterloo.		I	was	informed	that	if	I	have	any	comments	or	concerns	resulting	from	my	participation	in	this	study,	I	may	contact	the	Director,	Office	of	Research	Ethics	at	519-888-4567	ext.	36005.		With	full	knowledge	of	all	foregoing,	I	agree,	of	my	own	free	will,	to	participate	in	this	study.		By	submitting	the	completed	survey	online,	I	hereby	agree	to	the	above.	Print	Name:		 	 	 	 	 		UW	ID	#:		 	 	 	 	 			Dated	at	Waterloo,	Ontario:		 	 	 	 	 																					
	 Male	 	 Female	
	
	













”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 




”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 










”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 5 Item 4 Item 6 
   172 
Set	4		
					The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 
   173 
Set	5		
					 	The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 




triangle	”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 
   175 
Set	7		
					 	The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like		a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 
   176 
Set	8		
					 	The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 
Item 4 
Item 2 Item 3 
Item 5 
   177 
Set	9		
					 	The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 
   178 
Set	10		
					 	The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 
   179 
Set	11		
					 	The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 4 Item 5 Item 6 




”looks	red”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	yellow”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	triangle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	a	circle”		Item	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 
Item 5 Item 4 Item 6 




1	 	 looks	like	an	eagle	 	 looks	like	a	mask	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	spinal	vertebrae	(disc)	 	 looks	like	a	vase	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	mask	 	 looks	like	a	vase	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	spinal	vertebrae	(disc)	 	 looks	like	a	mask	
5.	 	 looks	like	an	eagle	 	 looks	like	bears	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	spinal	vertebrae	(disc)	 	 looks	like	an	eagle	
7.	 	 looks	like	a	spinal	vertebrae	(disc)	 	 looks	like	bears	
8.	 	 looks	like	an	eagle	 	 looks	like	a	butterfly	
9.	 	 looks	like	a	butterfly	 	 looks	like	a	vase	
10.	 	 looks	like	a	butterfly	 	 looks	like	bears	
11.	 	 looks	like	bears	 	 looks	like	a	vase	
12.	 	 looks	like	an	eagle	 	 looks	like	a	vase	
13.	 	 looks	like	a	mask	 	 looks	like	bears	
14.	 	 looks	like	a	butterfly	 	 looks	like	a	mask	








   182 
									Part	3	Now,	imagine	you	are	communicating	to	a	person	in	another	room	who	has	the	set	of	6	pictures	shown	at	the	left.	Your	goal	is	to	select	pictures	based	on	descriptions	provided	by	the	other	person.	For	each	of	the	following	descriptions	please	rank	the	items	from	1	to	6	in	terms	of	which	picture	the	person	is	most	likely	referring	to	(1	–	most	likely;	6	–	least	likely).																									 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description		
”looks	like	an	animal	skin”		Picture	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description	
”looks	like	bears”		Picture	Number	 Your	Rank	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	2	 	 	 	 	 	 	3	 	 	 	 	 	 	4	 	 	 	 	 	 	5	 	 	 	 	 	 	6	 	 	 	 	 	 	
The	other	person	uses	the	description		




















looks	like	a	cloud	 	 	 	 	 	 	
looks	like	art/statues	 	 	 	 	 	 	
looks	like	a	coat	hanged	 	 	 	 	 	 	
looks	like	two	people	 	 	 	 	 	 	
looks	like	a	vampire	 	 	 	 	 	 	












1.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
4.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
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Example	2		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	red	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	red	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	like	a	circle	
4.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	red	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		
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Example	3		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
3.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
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Example	4		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
2.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red		
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Example	5		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
5.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	
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Example	6		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
2.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
3.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
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Example	7		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
5.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
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Example	8		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
2.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
3.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow		
	
   192 
Example	9		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
2.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
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Example	10		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
4.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
5.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red		
	
   194 
Example	11		 	
		 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
3.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
4.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
5.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
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Example	12		 	
			 	
1.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	 	 looks	like	a	circle	
2.	 	 looks	like	a	circle		 	 looks	red	
3.	 	 looks	like	a	triangle		 	 looks	red	
4.	 	 looks	red	 	 looks	yellow	
5.	 	 looks	yellow	 	 looks	like	a	triangle	
6.	 	 looks	like	a	circle	 	 looks	yellow		
	





Reported Stimulus Designs  
Baseline stimulus designs – 01 
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Gap Size Manipulation – Stimulus designs 02 
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Gap Size Manipulation – Stimulus designs 03 
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Gap Size Manipulation – Stimulus designs 04  
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Gap Position Manipulation – Stimulus designs 05 
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Gap Position Manipulation – Stimulus designs 07 
 
  
   204 
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